Saturday, October 31, 2009

6694 cannot rely on client data

TRAPS IN RELIANCE ON CLIENT DATA

§1.6694-1 (e) Verification of information furnished by taxpayer

§1.6694-1 (e)(1) In general . For purposes of sections 6694(a) and (b) ‘reasonable cause and good faith under §1.6694-2(e));

The tax return preparer generally may rely in good faith without verification upon information furnished by the taxpayer and upon information and advice furnished by another advisor, another tax return preparer or other party (including another advisor or tax return preparer at the tax return preparer's firm).

The tax return preparer is not required to audit, examine or review books and records, business operations, documents, or other evidence to verify information provided by the taxpayer, advisor, other tax return preparer, or other party.

The tax return preparer, however, may not ignore the implications of information furnished to the tax return preparer or actually known by the tax return preparer. The tax return preparer must make reasonable inquiries if the information as furnished appears to be incorrect or incomplete. Additionally, some provisions of the Code or regulations require that specific facts and circumstances exist (for example, that the taxpayer maintain specific documents) before a deduction or credit may be claimed. The tax return preparer must make appropriate inquiries to determine the existence of facts and circumstances required by a Code section or regulation as a condition of the claiming of a deduction or credit.

COMMENT: Vagueness of terms: implications – must make reasonable inquiries –must make appropriate inquiries – facts and circumstances -
Subjective terms: actually known – good faith

The exceptions to the "reliance on client data" are so large that it would be relatively easy for the IRS to impose section 6694(b) penalties on an allegation that the tax return preparer did not make reasonable inquiries.

Also the mandatory "must" word in this regulation leaved no doubt that if there is a statutory notice requirement of a regulation substantiation requirement is not being filed, I see no possibility of escapint the 6694(a) penalty. It is my opinion that the IRS examiner will go for the 6694(b) penalty because failure to follow a regulation is easily within the "reckless" term under 6694(b).

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Friday, October 30, 2009

new risk for overseas investments

White House Press Release—Remarks by the President on International Tax Policy Reform, (May. 5, 2009)
2009ARD 087-4
Obama administration: Tax havens: International tax reform
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
May 4, 2009
REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY REFORM
Grand Foyer
11:39 A.M. EDT
THE PRESIDENT: All right. Good morning, everybody. Hope you all had a good weekend.
Let's begin with a simple premise: Nobody likes paying taxes, particularly in times of economic stress. But most Americans meet their responsibilities because they understand that it's an obligation of citizenship, necessary to pay the costs of our common defense and our mutual well-being.
And yet, even as most American citizens and businesses meet these responsibilities, there are others who are shirking theirs. And many are aided and abetted by a broken tax system, written by well-connected lobbyists on behalf of well-heeled interests and individuals. It's a tax code full of corporate loopholes that makes it perfectly legal for companies to avoid paying their fair share. It's a tax code that makes it all too easy for a number—a small number of individuals and companies to abuse overseas tax havens to avoid paying any taxes at all. And it's a tax code that says you should pay lower taxes if you create a job in Bangalore, India, than if you create one in Buffalo, New York.
Now, understand, one of the strengths of our economy is the global reach of our businesses. And I want to see our companies remain the most competitive in the world. But the way to make sure that happens is not to reward our companies for moving jobs off our shores or transferring profits to overseas tax havens. This is something that I talked about again and again during the course of the campaign. The way we make our businesses competitive is not to reward American companies operating overseas with a roughly 2 percent tax rate on foreign profits; a rate that costs—that costs taxpayers tens of billions of dollars a year. The way to make American businesses competitive is not to let some citizens and businesses dodge their responsibilities while ordinary Americans pick up the slack.
Unfortunately, that's exactly what we're doing. These problems have been highlighted by Chairmen Charlie Rangel and Max Baucus, by leaders like Senator Carl Levin and Congressman Lloyd Doggett. And now is the time to finally do something about them. And that's why today, I'm announcing a set of proposals to crack down on illegal overseas tax evasion, close loopholes, and make it more profitable for companies to create jobs here in the United States.
For years, we've talked about ending tax breaks for companies that ship jobs overseas and giving tax breaks to companies that create jobs here in America. That's what our budget will finally do. We will stop letting American companies that create jobs overseas take deductions on their expenses when they do not pay any American taxes on their profits. And we will use the savings to give tax cuts to companies that are investing in research and development here at home so that we can jumpstart job creation, foster innovation, and enhance America's competitiveness.
For years, we've talked about shutting down overseas tax havens that let companies set up operations to avoid paying taxes in America. That's what our budget will finally do. On the campaign, I used to talk about the outrage of a building in the Cayman Islands that had over 12,000 business—businesses claim this building as their headquarters. And I've said before, either this is the largest building in the world or the largest tax scam in the world.
And I think the American people know which it is. It's the kind of tax scam that we need to end. That's why we are closing one of our biggest tax loopholes. It's a loophole that lets subsidiaries of some of our largest companies tell the IRS that they're paying taxes abroad, tell foreign governments that they're paying taxes elsewhere—and avoid paying taxes anywhere. And closing this single loophole will save taxpayers tens of billions of dollars—money that can be spent on reinvesting in America—and it will restore fairness to our tax code by helping ensure that all our citizens and all our companies are paying what they should.
Now, for years, we've talked about stopping Americans from illegally hiding their money overseas, and getting tough with the financial institutions that let them get away with it. The Treasury Department and the IRS, under Secretary Geithner's leadership and Commissioner Shulman's, are already taking far-reaching steps to catch overseas tax cheats—but they need more support.
And that's why I'm asking Congress to pass some commonsense measures. One of these measures would let the IRS know how much income Americans are generating in overseas accounts by requiring overseas banks to provide 1099s for their American clients, just like Americans have to do for their bank accounts here in this country. If financial institutions won't cooperate with us, we will assume that they are sheltering money in tax havens, and act accordingly. And to ensure that the IRS has the tools it needs to enforce our laws, we're seeking to hire nearly 800 more IRS agents to detect and pursue American tax evaders abroad.
So all in all, these and other reforms will save American taxpayers $210 billion over the next 10 years—savings we can use to reduce the deficit, cut taxes for American businesses that are playing by the rules, and provide meaningful relief for hardworking families. That's what we're doing. We're putting a middle class tax cut in the pockets of 95 percent of working families, and we're providing a $2,500 annual tax credit to put the dream of a college degree or advanced training within the reach for more students. We're providing a tax credit worth up to $8,000 for first-time home buyers to help more Americans own a piece of the American Dream and to strengthen the housing market.
So the steps I am announcing today will help us deal with some of the most egregious examples of what's wrong with our tax code and will help us strengthen some of these other efforts. It's a down payment on the larger tax reform we need to make our tax system simpler and fairer and more efficient for individuals and corporations.
Now, it will take time to undo the damage of distorted provisions that were slipped into our tax code by lobbyists and special interests, but with the steps I'm announcing today we are beginning to crack down on Americans who are bending or breaking the rules, and we're helping to ensure that all Americans are contributing their fair share.
In other words, we're beginning to restore fairness and balance to our tax code. That's what I promised I would do during the campaign, that's what I'm committed to doing as President, and that is what I will work with members of my administration and members of Congress to accomplish in the months and years to come.
Thanks very much, guys.


White House Press Release—Leveling The Playing Field: Curbing Tax Havens and Removing Tax Incentives for Shifting Jobs Overseas, (May. 5, 2009)
2009ARD 087-1
Obama administration: Tax havens: International tax reform
Leveling the Playing Field: Curbing Tax Havens and Removing Tax Incentives For Shifting Jobs Overseas
There is no higher economic priority for President Obama than creating new, well-paying jobs in the United States. Yet today, our tax code actually provides a competitive advantage to companies that invest and create jobs overseas compared to those that invest and create those same jobs in the U.S. In addition, our tax system is rife with opportunities to evade and avoid taxes through offshore tax havens:
• ○ In 2004, the most recent year for which data is available, U.S. multinational corporations paid about $16 billion of U.S. tax on approximately $700 billion of foreign active earnings - an effective U.S. tax rate of about 2.3%.
• ○ A January 2009 GAO report found that of the 100 largest U.S. corporations, 83 have subsidiaries in tax havens.
• ○ In the Cayman Islands, one address alone houses 18,857 corporations, very few of which have a physical presence in the islands.
• ○ Nearly one-third of all foreign profits reported by U.S. corporations in 2003 came from just three small, low-tax countries: Bermuda, the Netherlands, and Ireland.
Today, President Obama and Secretary Geithner are unveiling two components of the Administration's plan to reform our international tax laws and improve their enforcement. First, they are calling for reforms to ensure that our tax code does not stack the deck against job creation here on our shores. Second, they seek to reduce the amount of taxes lost to tax havens - either through unintended loopholes that allow companies to legally avoid paying billions in taxes, or through the illegal use of hidden accounts by well-off individuals. Combined with further international tax reforms that will be unveiled in the Administration's full budget later in May, these initiatives would raise $210 billion over the next 10 years. The Obama Administration hopes to build on proposals by Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus and House Ways and Means Chairman Charles Rangel - as well as other leaders on this issue like Senator Carl Levin and Congressman Lloyd Doggett - to pass bipartisan legislation over the coming months.
1. Replacing Tax Advantages for Creating Jobs Overseas With Incentives to Create Them at Home: The Administration would raise $103.1 billion by removing tax advantages for investing overseas, and would use a portion of those resources to make permanent a tax credit for investment in research and innovation within the United States.
• Reforming Deferral Rules to Curb A Tax Advantage for Investing and Reinvesting Overseas: Currently, businesses that invest overseas can take immediate deductions on their U.S. tax returns for expenses supporting their overseas investments but nevertheless “defer” paying U.S. taxes on the profits they make from those investments. As a result, U.S. taxpayer dollars are used to provide a significant tax advantage to companies who invest overseas relative to those who invest and create jobs at home. The Obama Administration would reform the rules surrounding deferral so that - with the exception of research and experimentation expenses - companies cannot receive deductions on their U.S. tax returns supporting their offshore investments until they pay taxes on their offshore profits. This provision would take effect in 2011, raising $60.1 billion from 2011 to 2019.
• Closing Foreign Tax Credit Loopholes : Current law allows U.S. businesses that pay foreign taxes on overseas profits to claim a credit against their U.S. taxes for the foreign taxes paid. Some U.S. businesses use loopholes to artificially inflate or accelerate these credits. The Administration would close these loopholes, raising $43.0 billion from 2011 to 2019.
• Using Savings from Ending Unfair Overseas Tax Breaks to Permanently Extend the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit for Investment in the United States: The Research and Experimentation Tax Credit - which provides an incentive for businesses to invest in innovation in the United States - is currently set to expire at the end of 2009. To provide businesses with the certainty they need to make long-term investments in research and innovation, the Administration proposes making the R&E tax credit permanent, providing a tax cut of $74.5 billion over 10 years to businesses that invest in the United States.
2. Getting Tough on Overseas Tax Havens: The Administration's proposal would raise a total of $95.2 billion over the next 10 years through efforts to get tough on overseas tax havens by:
• Eliminating Loopholes for “Disappearing” Offshore Subsidiaries : Traditionally, U.S. companies have been required to report certain income shifted from one foreign subsidiary to another as passive income subject to U.S. tax. But over the past decade, so-called “check-the-box” rules have allowed companies to make their foreign subsidiaries “disappear” for tax purposes - permitting them to legally shift income to tax havens and make the taxes they owe the United States disappear as well. The Obama administration proposes to reform these rules to require certain foreign subsidiaries to be considered as separate corporations for U.S. tax purposes. This provision would take effect in 2011, raising $86.5 billion from 2011 to 2019.
• Cracking Down on the Abuse of Tax Havens by Individuals: Currently, wealthy Americans can evade paying taxes by hiding their money in offshore accounts with little fear that either the financial institution or the country that houses their money will report them to the IRS. In addition to initiatives taken within the G-20 to impose sanctions on countries judged by their peers not to be adequately implementing information exchange standards, the Obama Administration proposes a comprehensive package of disclosure and enforcement measures to make it more difficult for financial institutions and wealthy individuals to evade taxes. The Administration conservatively estimates this package would raise $8.7 billion over 10 years by:
o ○ Withholding Taxes From Accounts At Institutions That Don't Share Information With The United States: This proposal requires foreign financial institutions that have dealings with the United States to sign an agreement with the IRS to become a “Qualified Intermediary” and share as much information about their U.S. customers as U.S. financial institutions do, or else face the presumption that they may be facilitating tax evasion and have taxes withheld on payments to their customers. In addition, it would shut down loopholes that allow QIs to claim they are complying with the law even as they help wealthy U.S. citizens avoid paying their fair share of taxes.
o ○ Shifting the Burden of Proof and Increasing Penalties for Well-Off Individuals Who Seek to Abuse Tax Havens: In addition, the Obama Administration proposes tightening the reporting standards for overseas investments, increasing penalties and imposing negative presumptions on individuals who fail to report foreign accounts, and extending the statute of limitations for enforcement.
• Devoting New Resources for IRS Enforcement to Help Close the International Tax Gap: As part of the Obama Administration's budget, the IRS will hire nearly 800 new employees devoted to international enforcement, increasing its ability to crack down on offshore tax avoidance.
Leveling the Playing Field: Removing Tax Incentives For Moving Jobs Overseas and Curbing Tax Havens
Backgrounder
I. Replacing Tax Advantages to Create Jobs Overseas with Incentives to Create Jobs at Home
As the first plank of its international tax reform package, the Obama Administration intends to repeal the ability of American companies to take deductions against their U.S. taxable income for expenses supporting profits in low-tax jurisdictions on which they defer paying taxes on for years and perhaps indefinitely. Combined with closing loopholes in the foreign tax credit program, the revenues saved will be used to make permanent the tax credit for research and experimentation in the United States. This will be accomplished through:
1. Reforming Deferral Rules to Curb A Tax Advantage for Investing and Reinvesting Overseas
Current Law
• Companies Can Defer Paying Taxes on Overseas Profits Until Later, While Taking Tax Deductions on Their Foreign Expenses Now : Currently, a company that invests in America has to pay immediate U.S. taxes on its profits from that investment. But if the company instead invests and creates jobs overseas through a foreign subsidiary, it does not have to pay U.S. taxes on its overseas profits until those profits are brought back to the United States, if they ever are. Yet even though companies do not have to pay U.S. taxes on their overseas profits today, they still get to take deductions today on their U.S. tax returns for all of the expenses that support their overseas investment.
• Deferral Rules Use U.S. Taxpayer Dollars to Create A Tax Advantage for Companies That Invest Abroad: As a result, this preferential treatment uses U.S. taxpayer dollars to provide companies with an incentive to invest overseas, giving them a tax advantage over competitors who make the same investments to create jobs in the United States.
Example Under Current Law:
• Suppose that two U.S. companies decided to borrow to invest in a new factory. Company A invests that money to build its plant in the U.S., while Company B invests overseas in a jurisdiction with a tax rate of only 10 percent.
• Company A will be able to deduct its interest expense, reducing its overall U.S. tax liability by 35 cents for every dollar it pays in interest. But it will also pay a 35 percent tax rate on its corporate profits.
• Company B will also be able to deduct its interest expense from its U.S. tax liabilities at a 35 percent rate. But it will only face a tax of 10 percent on its profits.
• Thus, our current tax code uses U.S. taxpayer dollars to put companies that invest in the United States at a competitive advantage with companies who invest overseas.
The Administration's Proposal
• Level the Playing Field: The Administration's commonsense proposal, similar to an earlier measure proposed by House Ways and Means Chairman Charles Rangel, would level the playing field by requiring a company to defer any deductions - such as for interest expenses associated with untaxed overseas investment - until the company repatriates its earnings back home. In other words, companies would only be able to take a deduction on their U.S. taxes for foreign expenses when they also pay taxes on their foreign profits in the United States. This proposal makes an exception for deductions for research and experimentation because of the positive spillover impacts of those investments on the U.S. economy.
• Raise $60.1 Billion From 2011 to 2019: This proposal goes into effect in 2011, and would raise $60.1 billion between 2011 and 2019.
2. Closing Foreign Tax Credit Loopholes
Current Law
• Companies Can Take Advantage Of Foreign Tax Credit Loopholes: When a U.S. taxpayer has overseas income, taxes paid to the foreign jurisdiction can generally be credited against U.S. tax liabilities. In general, this “foreign tax credit” is available only for taxes paid on income that is taxable in the U.S. The intended result is that U.S. taxpayers with overseas income should pay no more tax on their U.S. taxable income than they would if it was all from U.S. sources. However, current rules and tax planning strategies make it possible to claim foreign tax credits for taxes paid on foreign income that is not subject to current U.S. tax. As a result, companies are able to use such credits to pay less tax on their U.S. taxable income than they would if it was all from U.S. sources - providing them with a competitive advantage over companies that invest in the United States.
The Administration's Proposal
• Reform the Foreign Tax Credit to Remove Unfair Tax Advantages for Overseas Investment: The Administration's proposal would take two steps to rein in foreign tax credit schemes. First, a taxpayer's foreign tax credit would be determined based on the amount of total foreign tax the taxpayer actually pays on its total foreign earnings. Second, a foreign tax credit would no longer be allowed for foreign taxes paid on income not subject to U.S. tax. These reforms would go into effect in 2011, raising $43.0 billion from 2011 to 2019.
3. Making R&E Tax Credit Permanent to Encourage Investment in Innovation in the United States: The resources saved by curbing tax incentives for jobs overseas and limiting losses to tax havens would be used to strengthen incentives to invest in jobs in the United States by making permanent the R&E tax credit.
Current Law
• R&E Credit Is Set to Expire At End of 2009 : Under current law, companies are eligible for a tax credit equal to 20 percent of qualified research expenses above a base amount. But the research and experimentation tax credit has never been made permanent - instead, it has been extended on a temporary basis 13 times since it was first created in 1981 - and is set to expire on December 31, 2009.
How It Works
• Through the research and experimentation tax credit, companies receive a credit valued at 20 percent of qualified research expenses in the United States above a base amount. Taxpayers can also elect to take an alternative simplified research credit that provides an incentive for increasing research expenses above the level of the previous three years. Taxpayers may also take a credit based on spending on basic research and certain energy research.
• Any uncertainty about whether the R&E credit will be extended reduces its effectiveness in stimulating investments in new innovation, as it becomes more difficult for taxpayers to factor the credit into decisions to invest in research projects that will not be initiated or completed prior to the credit's expiration.
The Administration's Proposal
• Create Certainty to Encourage New Investment and Innovation at Home By Making the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit Permanent: To give companies the certainty they need to make long-term research and experimentation investment in the U.S., the Administration's budget includes the full cost of making the R&E credit permanent in future years. By making this tax credit permanent, businesses would be provided with the greater confidence they need to initiate new research projects that will improve productivity, raise standards of living, and increase our competitiveness. And with over 75 percent of credit dollars attributed to wages, the credit would provide an important incentive for businesses to create new jobs.
• Paid For With Provisions That Make the Tax Code More Efficient and Fair: This change would cost $74.5 billion over 10 years, which will be paid for by reforming the treatment of deferred income and the use of the foreign tax credit.
II. Getting Tough on Overseas Tax Havens
Some countries make it easy for U.S. taxpayers to evade or avoid U.S. taxes by withholding information about U.S.-held accounts or giving favorable tax treatment to shell corporations created just to avoid taxes. In certain cases, companies are taking advantage of currently legal loopholes to avoid paying taxes by shifting their profits to tax havens. In other cases, Americans break the law by hiding their income in hidden overseas accounts, and these tax havens refuse to provide the information the IRS needs to enforce U.S. law. Either way, these tax havens make our tax system less fair and harm the U.S. economy. President Obama proposes to address tax havens by:
1. Eliminating Loopholes that Allow “Disappearing” Offshore Subsidiaries: Current law allows U.S. businesses to establish foreign subsidiary corporations, but then to “check a box” to pretend that the subsidiaries do not exist for U.S. tax purposes. This practice allows taxes that would otherwise be paid in the U.S. on passive income to be avoided, at great cost to U.S. taxpayers.
Current Law
• Disappearing Subsidiaries Allow Corporations to Shift Income Tax-Free: Traditionally, if a U.S. company sets up a foreign subsidiary in a tax haven and one in another country, income shifted between the two subsidiaries (for example, through interest on loans) would be considered “passive income” for the U.S. company and subject to U.S. tax. Over the last decade, so-called “check-the box” rules have allowed U.S. firms to make these subsidiaries disappear for U.S. tax purposes. With the separate subsidiaries disregarded, the firm can shift income among them without reporting any passive income or paying any U.S. tax. As a result, U.S. firms that invest overseas are able to shift their income to tax havens. It is clear that this loophole, while legal, has become a reason to shift billions of dollars in investments from the U.S. to other counties.
Example under Current Law
• Suppose that a U.S. company invests $10 million to build a new factory in Germany. At the same time, it sets up three new corporations. The first is a wholly owned Cayman Islands holding company. The second is a corporation in Germany, which is owned by the holding company and owns the factory. The third is a Cayman Islands subsidiary, also owned by the Cayman Islands holding company.
• The Cayman subsidiary makes a loan to the German subsidiary. The interest on the loan is income to the Cayman subsidiary and a deductible expense for the German subsidiary. In this way, income is shifted from higher-tax Germany to the no-tax Cayman Islands.
• Under traditional U.S. tax law, this income shift would count as passive income for the U.S. parent - which would have to pay taxes on it. But “check the box” rules allow the firm to make the two subsidiaries disappear — and the income shift with them. As a result, the firm is able to avoid both U.S. taxes and German taxes on its profits.
The Administration's Proposal
• Require U.S. Businesses That Establish Certain Foreign Corporations To Treat Them As Corporations For U.S. Tax Purposes: The Administration's proposal seeks to abolish a range of tax-avoidance techniques by requiring U.S. businesses that establish certain corporations overseas to report them as corporations on their U.S. tax returns. As a result, U.S. firms that invest overseas would no longer be able to make their subsidiaries — or their income shifts to tax havens — disappear for tax purposes. This would level the playing field between firms that invest overseas and those that invest at home.
• Raise $86.5 Billion from 2011 to 2019: This loophole would be closed beginning in 2011, raising $86.5 billion from 2011 to 2019.
2. Cracking Down on the Abuse of Tax Havens by Individuals: The IRS is already engaged in significant efforts to track down and collect taxes from individuals illegally hiding income overseas. But to fully follow through on this effort, it will need new legal authorities. Current law makes it difficult for the IRS to collect the information it needs to determine that the holder of a foreign bank account is a U.S. citizen evading taxation. The Obama administration proposes changes that will enhance information reporting, increase tax withholding, strengthen penalties, and shift the burden of proof to make it harder for foreign account-holders to evade U.S. taxes, while also providing the enforcement tools necessary to crack down on tax haven abuse.
Current Law
• A Free Ride for Financial Institutions that Flout Reporting Rules: A centerpiece of the current U.S. regime to combat international tax evasion is the Qualified Intermediary (QI) program, under which financial institutions sign an agreement to share information about their U.S. customers with the IRS. Unfortunately, this regime, while effective, has become subject to abuse:
o ○ At Non-Qualifying Institutions, Withholding Requirements Are Easy to Escape: Currently, an investor can escape withholding requirements by simply attesting to being a non-U.S. person. That leaves it to the IRS to show that the investor is actually a U.S. citizen evading the law.
o ○ Loopholes Allow Qualifying Institutions to Still Serve as Conduits for Evasion: Moreover, financial institutions can qualify as QIs even if they are affiliated with non-QIs. As a result, a financial institution need not give up its business as a conduit for tax evasion in order to enjoy the benefits of being a QI. In addition, QIs are not currently required to report the foreign income of their U.S. customers, so U.S. customers may hide behind foreign entities to evade taxes through QIs.
o ○ Legal Presumptions Favor Tax Evaders Who Conceal Transactions: U.S. investors overseas are required to file the Foreign Bank and Financial Account Report, or FBAR, disclosing ownership of financial accounts in a foreign country containing over $10,000. The FBAR is particularly important in the case of investors who employ non-QIs, because their transactions are less likely to be disclosed otherwise. Unfortunately, current rules make it difficult to catch those who are supposed to file the FBAR but do not. And even when the IRS has evidence that a U.S. taxpayer has a foreign account, legal presumptions currently favor the tax evader — without specific evidence that the U.S person has an account that requires an FBAR, the IRS cannot compel an investor to provide the report or impose penalties for the failure to do so. This specific evidence may be almost impossible for the IRS to get.
• The IRS Lacks the Tools It Needs to Enforce International Tax Laws: In addition to the shortcomings of the QI program, current law features inadequate tools to crack down on wealthy taxpayers who evade taxation. Investors who withhold information about overseas investments face penalties limited to 20 percent of the amount of the understatement. The statute of limitations for enforcement is typically only three years - which is often too short a time period for the IRS to get the information it needs to determine whether a taxpayer with an offshore account paid the right amount of tax. And there are no requirements that U.S. individuals or third parties report transfers to and from foreign accounts, limiting the ability of the IRS to determine whether taxpayers are paying what they owe.
Example Under Current Law
• Through a U.S. broker, a U.S. account-holder at a non-qualified intermediary sells $50 million worth of securities.
• If the seller self-certifies that he is not a U.S. citizen and the non-qualified intermediary simply passes that information along to the U.S. broker, the broker may rely on that statement and does not need to withhold money from the transaction.
• As a result, a U.S. taxpayer who provides a false self-certification can easily avoid paying taxes, since the non-QI has not signed an agreement with the IRS, and the IRS may have limited tools to detect any wrongdoing.
Proposal
In addition to initiatives taken within the G-20 to impose sanctions on countries judged by their peers not to be adequately implementing information exchange standards, the Obama administration proposes to make it more difficult to shelter foreign investments from taxation by cracking down on financial institutions that enable and profit from international tax evasion. These measures - expected to raise $8.7 billion over 10 years - would:
• Strengthen the “Qualified Intermediary” System to Crack Down on Tax Evaders: The core of the Obama Administration's proposals is a tough new stance on investors who use financial institutions that do not agree to be Qualifying Intermediaries. Under this proposal, the assumption will be that these institutions are facilitating tax evasion, and the burden of proof will be shifted to the institutions and their account-holders to prove they are not sheltering income from U.S. taxation. As a result, the Administration proposes to:
o Impose Significant Tax Withholding On Transactions Involving Non-Qualifying Intermediaries: The Administration's plan would require U.S. financial institutions to withhold 20 percent to 30 percent of U.S. payments to individuals who use non-QIs. To get a refund for the amount withheld, investors must disclose their identities and demonstrate that they're obeying the law.
o Create A Legal Presumption Against Users Of Non-Qualifying Intermediaries: The Administration's plan would create rebuttable evidentiary presumptions that any foreign bank, brokerage, or other financial account held by a U.S. citizen at a non-QI contains enough funds to require that an FBAR be filed, and that any failure to file an FBAR is willful if an account at a non-QI has a balance of greater than $200,000 at any point during the calendar year. These presumptions will make it easier for the IRS to demand information and pursue cases against international tax evaders. This shifting of legal presumptions is a key component of the anti-tax haven legislation long championed by Senator Carl Levin.
o Limit QI Affiliations With Non-QIs: The Administration's plan would give the Treasury Department authority to issue regulations requiring that a financial institution may be a QI only if all commonly-controlled financial institutions are also QIs. As a result, financial firms couldn't benefit from siphoning business from their legitimate QI operations to illegitimate non-QI affiliates.
• Provide the IRS With The Legal Tools Necessary to Prosecute International Tax Evasion : The Obama administration proposes to improve the ability of the IRS to successfully prosecute international tax evasion through the following steps:
o Increase Penalties for Failing to Report Overseas Investments : The Administration's plan would double certain penalties when a taxpayer fails to make a required disclosure of foreign financial accounts.
o Extend the Statute of Limitations for International Tax Enforcement: The Administration's plan would set the statute of limitations on international tax enforcement at six years after the taxpayer submits required information.
o Tighten Lax Reporting Requirements : The Administration's plan would increase the reporting requirement on international investors and financial institutions, especially QIs. QIs would be required to report information on their U.S. customers to the same extent that U.S. financial intermediaries must. And U.S. customers at QIs would no longer be allowed to hide behind foreign entities. U.S. investors would be required to report transfers of money or property made to or from non-QI foreign financial institutions on their income tax returns. Financial institutions would face enhanced information reporting requirements for transactions that establish a foreign business entity or transfer assets to and from foreign financial accounts on behalf of U.S. individuals.
3. Hire Nearly 800 New IRS Staff to Increase International Enforcement: As part of the President's budget, the IRS would be provided with funds to support the hiring of nearly 800 new employees devoted specifically to international enforcement. The funding would allow the IRS to hire new agents, economists, lawyers and specialists, increasing the IRS' ability to crack down on offshore tax avoidance and evasion, including through transfer pricing and financial products and transactions such as purported securities loans. According to estimates by the IRS, every additional dollar invested in enforcement in recent years has yielded about four dollars in added tax revenues.
White House Press Release—Leveling The Playing Field: Curbing Tax Havens and Removing Tax Incentives for Shifting Jobs Overseas, (May. 5, 2009)
2009ARD 087-1
Obama administration: Tax havens: International tax reform
Leveling the Playing Field: Curbing Tax Havens and Removing Tax Incentives For Shifting Jobs Overseas
There is no higher economic priority for President Obama than creating new, well-paying jobs in the United States. Yet today, our tax code actually provides a competitive advantage to companies that invest and create jobs overseas compared to those that invest and create those same jobs in the U.S. In addition, our tax system is rife with opportunities to evade and avoid taxes through offshore tax havens:
• ○ In 2004, the most recent year for which data is available, U.S. multinational corporations paid about $16 billion of U.S. tax on approximately $700 billion of foreign active earnings - an effective U.S. tax rate of about 2.3%.
• ○ A January 2009 GAO report found that of the 100 largest U.S. corporations, 83 have subsidiaries in tax havens.
• ○ In the Cayman Islands, one address alone houses 18,857 corporations, very few of which have a physical presence in the islands.
• ○ Nearly one-third of all foreign profits reported by U.S. corporations in 2003 came from just three small, low-tax countries: Bermuda, the Netherlands, and Ireland.
Today, President Obama and Secretary Geithner are unveiling two components of the Administration's plan to reform our international tax laws and improve their enforcement. First, they are calling for reforms to ensure that our tax code does not stack the deck against job creation here on our shores. Second, they seek to reduce the amount of taxes lost to tax havens - either through unintended loopholes that allow companies to legally avoid paying billions in taxes, or through the illegal use of hidden accounts by well-off individuals. Combined with further international tax reforms that will be unveiled in the Administration's full budget later in May, these initiatives would raise $210 billion over the next 10 years. The Obama Administration hopes to build on proposals by Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus and House Ways and Means Chairman Charles Rangel - as well as other leaders on this issue like Senator Carl Levin and Congressman Lloyd Doggett - to pass bipartisan legislation over the coming months.
1. Replacing Tax Advantages for Creating Jobs Overseas With Incentives to Create Them at Home: The Administration would raise $103.1 billion by removing tax advantages for investing overseas, and would use a portion of those resources to make permanent a tax credit for investment in research and innovation within the United States.
• Reforming Deferral Rules to Curb A Tax Advantage for Investing and Reinvesting Overseas: Currently, businesses that invest overseas can take immediate deductions on their U.S. tax returns for expenses supporting their overseas investments but nevertheless “defer” paying U.S. taxes on the profits they make from those investments. As a result, U.S. taxpayer dollars are used to provide a significant tax advantage to companies who invest overseas relative to those who invest and create jobs at home. The Obama Administration would reform the rules surrounding deferral so that - with the exception of research and experimentation expenses - companies cannot receive deductions on their U.S. tax returns supporting their offshore investments until they pay taxes on their offshore profits. This provision would take effect in 2011, raising $60.1 billion from 2011 to 2019.
• Closing Foreign Tax Credit Loopholes : Current law allows U.S. businesses that pay foreign taxes on overseas profits to claim a credit against their U.S. taxes for the foreign taxes paid. Some U.S. businesses use loopholes to artificially inflate or accelerate these credits. The Administration would close these loopholes, raising $43.0 billion from 2011 to 2019.
• Using Savings from Ending Unfair Overseas Tax Breaks to Permanently Extend the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit for Investment in the United States: The Research and Experimentation Tax Credit - which provides an incentive for businesses to invest in innovation in the United States - is currently set to expire at the end of 2009. To provide businesses with the certainty they need to make long-term investments in research and innovation, the Administration proposes making the R&E tax credit permanent, providing a tax cut of $74.5 billion over 10 years to businesses that invest in the United States.
2. Getting Tough on Overseas Tax Havens: The Administration's proposal would raise a total of $95.2 billion over the next 10 years through efforts to get tough on overseas tax havens by:
• Eliminating Loopholes for “Disappearing” Offshore Subsidiaries : Traditionally, U.S. companies have been required to report certain income shifted from one foreign subsidiary to another as passive income subject to U.S. tax. But over the past decade, so-called “check-the-box” rules have allowed companies to make their foreign subsidiaries “disappear” for tax purposes - permitting them to legally shift income to tax havens and make the taxes they owe the United States disappear as well. The Obama administration proposes to reform these rules to require certain foreign subsidiaries to be considered as separate corporations for U.S. tax purposes. This provision would take effect in 2011, raising $86.5 billion from 2011 to 2019.
• Cracking Down on the Abuse of Tax Havens by Individuals: Currently, wealthy Americans can evade paying taxes by hiding their money in offshore accounts with little fear that either the financial institution or the country that houses their money will report them to the IRS. In addition to initiatives taken within the G-20 to impose sanctions on countries judged by their peers not to be adequately implementing information exchange standards, the Obama Administration proposes a comprehensive package of disclosure and enforcement measures to make it more difficult for financial institutions and wealthy individuals to evade taxes. The Administration conservatively estimates this package would raise $8.7 billion over 10 years by:
o ○ Withholding Taxes From Accounts At Institutions That Don't Share Information With The United States: This proposal requires foreign financial institutions that have dealings with the United States to sign an agreement with the IRS to become a “Qualified Intermediary” and share as much information about their U.S. customers as U.S. financial institutions do, or else face the presumption that they may be facilitating tax evasion and have taxes withheld on payments to their customers. In addition, it would shut down loopholes that allow QIs to claim they are complying with the law even as they help wealthy U.S. citizens avoid paying their fair share of taxes.
o ○ Shifting the Burden of Proof and Increasing Penalties for Well-Off Individuals Who Seek to Abuse Tax Havens: In addition, the Obama Administration proposes tightening the reporting standards for overseas investments, increasing penalties and imposing negative presumptions on individuals who fail to report foreign accounts, and extending the statute of limitations for enforcement.
• Devoting New Resources for IRS Enforcement to Help Close the International Tax Gap: As part of the Obama Administration's budget, the IRS will hire nearly 800 new employees devoted to international enforcement, increasing its ability to crack down on offshore tax avoidance.
Leveling the Playing Field: Removing Tax Incentives For Moving Jobs Overseas and Curbing Tax Havens
Backgrounder
I. Replacing Tax Advantages to Create Jobs Overseas with Incentives to Create Jobs at Home
As the first plank of its international tax reform package, the Obama Administration intends to repeal the ability of American companies to take deductions against their U.S. taxable income for expenses supporting profits in low-tax jurisdictions on which they defer paying taxes on for years and perhaps indefinitely. Combined with closing loopholes in the foreign tax credit program, the revenues saved will be used to make permanent the tax credit for research and experimentation in the United States. This will be accomplished through:
1. Reforming Deferral Rules to Curb A Tax Advantage for Investing and Reinvesting Overseas
Current Law
• Companies Can Defer Paying Taxes on Overseas Profits Until Later, While Taking Tax Deductions on Their Foreign Expenses Now : Currently, a company that invests in America has to pay immediate U.S. taxes on its profits from that investment. But if the company instead invests and creates jobs overseas through a foreign subsidiary, it does not have to pay U.S. taxes on its overseas profits until those profits are brought back to the United States, if they ever are. Yet even though companies do not have to pay U.S. taxes on their overseas profits today, they still get to take deductions today on their U.S. tax returns for all of the expenses that support their overseas investment.
• Deferral Rules Use U.S. Taxpayer Dollars to Create A Tax Advantage for Companies That Invest Abroad: As a result, this preferential treatment uses U.S. taxpayer dollars to provide companies with an incentive to invest overseas, giving them a tax advantage over competitors who make the same investments to create jobs in the United States.
Example Under Current Law:
• Suppose that two U.S. companies decided to borrow to invest in a new factory. Company A invests that money to build its plant in the U.S., while Company B invests overseas in a jurisdiction with a tax rate of only 10 percent.
• Company A will be able to deduct its interest expense, reducing its overall U.S. tax liability by 35 cents for every dollar it pays in interest. But it will also pay a 35 percent tax rate on its corporate profits.
• Company B will also be able to deduct its interest expense from its U.S. tax liabilities at a 35 percent rate. But it will only face a tax of 10 percent on its profits.
• Thus, our current tax code uses U.S. taxpayer dollars to put companies that invest in the United States at a competitive advantage with companies who invest overseas.
The Administration's Proposal
• Level the Playing Field: The Administration's commonsense proposal, similar to an earlier measure proposed by House Ways and Means Chairman Charles Rangel, would level the playing field by requiring a company to defer any deductions - such as for interest expenses associated with untaxed overseas investment - until the company repatriates its earnings back home. In other words, companies would only be able to take a deduction on their U.S. taxes for foreign expenses when they also pay taxes on their foreign profits in the United States. This proposal makes an exception for deductions for research and experimentation because of the positive spillover impacts of those investments on the U.S. economy.
• Raise $60.1 Billion From 2011 to 2019: This proposal goes into effect in 2011, and would raise $60.1 billion between 2011 and 2019.
2. Closing Foreign Tax Credit Loopholes
Current Law
• Companies Can Take Advantage Of Foreign Tax Credit Loopholes: When a U.S. taxpayer has overseas income, taxes paid to the foreign jurisdiction can generally be credited against U.S. tax liabilities. In general, this “foreign tax credit” is available only for taxes paid on income that is taxable in the U.S. The intended result is that U.S. taxpayers with overseas income should pay no more tax on their U.S. taxable income than they would if it was all from U.S. sources. However, current rules and tax planning strategies make it possible to claim foreign tax credits for taxes paid on foreign income that is not subject to current U.S. tax. As a result, companies are able to use such credits to pay less tax on their U.S. taxable income than they would if it was all from U.S. sources - providing them with a competitive advantage over companies that invest in the United States.
The Administration's Proposal
• Reform the Foreign Tax Credit to Remove Unfair Tax Advantages for Overseas Investment: The Administration's proposal would take two steps to rein in foreign tax credit schemes. First, a taxpayer's foreign tax credit would be determined based on the amount of total foreign tax the taxpayer actually pays on its total foreign earnings. Second, a foreign tax credit would no longer be allowed for foreign taxes paid on income not subject to U.S. tax. These reforms would go into effect in 2011, raising $43.0 billion from 2011 to 2019.
3. Making R&E Tax Credit Permanent to Encourage Investment in Innovation in the United States: The resources saved by curbing tax incentives for jobs overseas and limiting losses to tax havens would be used to strengthen incentives to invest in jobs in the United States by making permanent the R&E tax credit.
Current Law
• R&E Credit Is Set to Expire At End of 2009 : Under current law, companies are eligible for a tax credit equal to 20 percent of qualified research expenses above a base amount. But the research and experimentation tax credit has never been made permanent - instead, it has been extended on a temporary basis 13 times since it was first created in 1981 - and is set to expire on December 31, 2009.
How It Works
• Through the research and experimentation tax credit, companies receive a credit valued at 20 percent of qualified research expenses in the United States above a base amount. Taxpayers can also elect to take an alternative simplified research credit that provides an incentive for increasing research expenses above the level of the previous three years. Taxpayers may also take a credit based on spending on basic research and certain energy research.
• Any uncertainty about whether the R&E credit will be extended reduces its effectiveness in stimulating investments in new innovation, as it becomes more difficult for taxpayers to factor the credit into decisions to invest in research projects that will not be initiated or completed prior to the credit's expiration.
The Administration's Proposal
• Create Certainty to Encourage New Investment and Innovation at Home By Making the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit Permanent: To give companies the certainty they need to make long-term research and experimentation investment in the U.S., the Administration's budget includes the full cost of making the R&E credit permanent in future years. By making this tax credit permanent, businesses would be provided with the greater confidence they need to initiate new research projects that will improve productivity, raise standards of living, and increase our competitiveness. And with over 75 percent of credit dollars attributed to wages, the credit would provide an important incentive for businesses to create new jobs.
• Paid For With Provisions That Make the Tax Code More Efficient and Fair: This change would cost $74.5 billion over 10 years, which will be paid for by reforming the treatment of deferred income and the use of the foreign tax credit.
II. Getting Tough on Overseas Tax Havens
Some countries make it easy for U.S. taxpayers to evade or avoid U.S. taxes by withholding information about U.S.-held accounts or giving favorable tax treatment to shell corporations created just to avoid taxes. In certain cases, companies are taking advantage of currently legal loopholes to avoid paying taxes by shifting their profits to tax havens. In other cases, Americans break the law by hiding their income in hidden overseas accounts, and these tax havens refuse to provide the information the IRS needs to enforce U.S. law. Either way, these tax havens make our tax system less fair and harm the U.S. economy. President Obama proposes to address tax havens by:
1. Eliminating Loopholes that Allow “Disappearing” Offshore Subsidiaries: Current law allows U.S. businesses to establish foreign subsidiary corporations, but then to “check a box” to pretend that the subsidiaries do not exist for U.S. tax purposes. This practice allows taxes that would otherwise be paid in the U.S. on passive income to be avoided, at great cost to U.S. taxpayers.
Current Law
• Disappearing Subsidiaries Allow Corporations to Shift Income Tax-Free: Traditionally, if a U.S. company sets up a foreign subsidiary in a tax haven and one in another country, income shifted between the two subsidiaries (for example, through interest on loans) would be considered “passive income” for the U.S. company and subject to U.S. tax. Over the last decade, so-called “check-the box” rules have allowed U.S. firms to make these subsidiaries disappear for U.S. tax purposes. With the separate subsidiaries disregarded, the firm can shift income among them without reporting any passive income or paying any U.S. tax. As a result, U.S. firms that invest overseas are able to shift their income to tax havens. It is clear that this loophole, while legal, has become a reason to shift billions of dollars in investments from the U.S. to other counties.
Example under Current Law
• Suppose that a U.S. company invests $10 million to build a new factory in Germany. At the same time, it sets up three new corporations. The first is a wholly owned Cayman Islands holding company. The second is a corporation in Germany, which is owned by the holding company and owns the factory. The third is a Cayman Islands subsidiary, also owned by the Cayman Islands holding company.
• The Cayman subsidiary makes a loan to the German subsidiary. The interest on the loan is income to the Cayman subsidiary and a deductible expense for the German subsidiary. In this way, income is shifted from higher-tax Germany to the no-tax Cayman Islands.
• Under traditional U.S. tax law, this income shift would count as passive income for the U.S. parent - which would have to pay taxes on it. But “check the box” rules allow the firm to make the two subsidiaries disappear — and the income shift with them. As a result, the firm is able to avoid both U.S. taxes and German taxes on its profits.
The Administration's Proposal
• Require U.S. Businesses That Establish Certain Foreign Corporations To Treat Them As Corporations For U.S. Tax Purposes: The Administration's proposal seeks to abolish a range of tax-avoidance techniques by requiring U.S. businesses that establish certain corporations overseas to report them as corporations on their U.S. tax returns. As a result, U.S. firms that invest overseas would no longer be able to make their subsidiaries — or their income shifts to tax havens — disappear for tax purposes. This would level the playing field between firms that invest overseas and those that invest at home.
• Raise $86.5 Billion from 2011 to 2019: This loophole would be closed beginning in 2011, raising $86.5 billion from 2011 to 2019.
2. Cracking Down on the Abuse of Tax Havens by Individuals: The IRS is already engaged in significant efforts to track down and collect taxes from individuals illegally hiding income overseas. But to fully follow through on this effort, it will need new legal authorities. Current law makes it difficult for the IRS to collect the information it needs to determine that the holder of a foreign bank account is a U.S. citizen evading taxation. The Obama administration proposes changes that will enhance information reporting, increase tax withholding, strengthen penalties, and shift the burden of proof to make it harder for foreign account-holders to evade U.S. taxes, while also providing the enforcement tools necessary to crack down on tax haven abuse.
Current Law
• A Free Ride for Financial Institutions that Flout Reporting Rules: A centerpiece of the current U.S. regime to combat international tax evasion is the Qualified Intermediary (QI) program, under which financial institutions sign an agreement to share information about their U.S. customers with the IRS. Unfortunately, this regime, while effective, has become subject to abuse:
o ○ At Non-Qualifying Institutions, Withholding Requirements Are Easy to Escape: Currently, an investor can escape withholding requirements by simply attesting to being a non-U.S. person. That leaves it to the IRS to show that the investor is actually a U.S. citizen evading the law.
o ○ Loopholes Allow Qualifying Institutions to Still Serve as Conduits for Evasion: Moreover, financial institutions can qualify as QIs even if they are affiliated with non-QIs. As a result, a financial institution need not give up its business as a conduit for tax evasion in order to enjoy the benefits of being a QI. In addition, QIs are not currently required to report the foreign income of their U.S. customers, so U.S. customers may hide behind foreign entities to evade taxes through QIs.
o ○ Legal Presumptions Favor Tax Evaders Who Conceal Transactions: U.S. investors overseas are required to file the Foreign Bank and Financial Account Report, or FBAR, disclosing ownership of financial accounts in a foreign country containing over $10,000. The FBAR is particularly important in the case of investors who employ non-QIs, because their transactions are less likely to be disclosed otherwise. Unfortunately, current rules make it difficult to catch those who are supposed to file the FBAR but do not. And even when the IRS has evidence that a U.S. taxpayer has a foreign account, legal presumptions currently favor the tax evader — without specific evidence that the U.S person has an account that requires an FBAR, the IRS cannot compel an investor to provide the report or impose penalties for the failure to do so. This specific evidence may be almost impossible for the IRS to get.
• The IRS Lacks the Tools It Needs to Enforce International Tax Laws: In addition to the shortcomings of the QI program, current law features inadequate tools to crack down on wealthy taxpayers who evade taxation. Investors who withhold information about overseas investments face penalties limited to 20 percent of the amount of the understatement. The statute of limitations for enforcement is typically only three years - which is often too short a time period for the IRS to get the information it needs to determine whether a taxpayer with an offshore account paid the right amount of tax. And there are no requirements that U.S. individuals or third parties report transfers to and from foreign accounts, limiting the ability of the IRS to determine whether taxpayers are paying what they owe.
Example Under Current Law
• Through a U.S. broker, a U.S. account-holder at a non-qualified intermediary sells $50 million worth of securities.
• If the seller self-certifies that he is not a U.S. citizen and the non-qualified intermediary simply passes that information along to the U.S. broker, the broker may rely on that statement and does not need to withhold money from the transaction.
• As a result, a U.S. taxpayer who provides a false self-certification can easily avoid paying taxes, since the non-QI has not signed an agreement with the IRS, and the IRS may have limited tools to detect any wrongdoing.
Proposal
In addition to initiatives taken within the G-20 to impose sanctions on countries judged by their peers not to be adequately implementing information exchange standards, the Obama administration proposes to make it more difficult to shelter foreign investments from taxation by cracking down on financial institutions that enable and profit from international tax evasion. These measures - expected to raise $8.7 billion over 10 years - would:
• Strengthen the “Qualified Intermediary” System to Crack Down on Tax Evaders: The core of the Obama Administration's proposals is a tough new stance on investors who use financial institutions that do not agree to be Qualifying Intermediaries. Under this proposal, the assumption will be that these institutions are facilitating tax evasion, and the burden of proof will be shifted to the institutions and their account-holders to prove they are not sheltering income from U.S. taxation. As a result, the Administration proposes to:
o Impose Significant Tax Withholding On Transactions Involving Non-Qualifying Intermediaries: The Administration's plan would require U.S. financial institutions to withhold 20 percent to 30 percent of U.S. payments to individuals who use non-QIs. To get a refund for the amount withheld, investors must disclose their identities and demonstrate that they're obeying the law.
o Create A Legal Presumption Against Users Of Non-Qualifying Intermediaries: The Administration's plan would create rebuttable evidentiary presumptions that any foreign bank, brokerage, or other financial account held by a U.S. citizen at a non-QI contains enough funds to require that an FBAR be filed, and that any failure to file an FBAR is willful if an account at a non-QI has a balance of greater than $200,000 at any point during the calendar year. These presumptions will make it easier for the IRS to demand information and pursue cases against international tax evaders. This shifting of legal presumptions is a key component of the anti-tax haven legislation long championed by Senator Carl Levin.
o Limit QI Affiliations With Non-QIs: The Administration's plan would give the Treasury Department authority to issue regulations requiring that a financial institution may be a QI only if all commonly-controlled financial institutions are also QIs. As a result, financial firms couldn't benefit from siphoning business from their legitimate QI operations to illegitimate non-QI affiliates.
• Provide the IRS With The Legal Tools Necessary to Prosecute International Tax Evasion : The Obama administration proposes to improve the ability of the IRS to successfully prosecute international tax evasion through the following steps:
o Increase Penalties for Failing to Report Overseas Investments : The Administration's plan would double certain penalties when a taxpayer fails to make a required disclosure of foreign financial accounts.
o Extend the Statute of Limitations for International Tax Enforcement: The Administration's plan would set the statute of limitations on international tax enforcement at six years after the taxpayer submits required information.
o Tighten Lax Reporting Requirements : The Administration's plan would increase the reporting requirement on international investors and financial institutions, especially QIs. QIs would be required to report information on their U.S. customers to the same extent that U.S. financial intermediaries must. And U.S. customers at QIs would no longer be allowed to hide behind foreign entities. U.S. investors would be required to report transfers of money or property made to or from non-QI foreign financial institutions on their income tax returns. Financial institutions would face enhanced information reporting requirements for transactions that establish a foreign business entity or transfer assets to and from foreign financial accounts on behalf of U.S. individuals.
3. Hire Nearly 800 New IRS Staff to Increase International Enforcement: As part of the President's budget, the IRS would be provided with funds to support the hiring of nearly 800 new employees devoted specifically to international enforcement. The funding would allow the IRS to hire new agents, economists, lawyers and specialists, increasing the IRS' ability to crack down on offshore tax avoidance and evasion, including through transfer pricing and financial products and transactions such as purported securities loans. According to estimates by the IRS, every additional dollar invested in enforcement in recent years has yielded about four dollars in added tax revenues.



Tax Day,T.1International Tax Reform Needed to Discourage Offshore Economic Activity, Treasury Official Says, (Oct. 29, 2009)
Stephen Shay, Treasury deputy assistant secretary (International Tax Affairs), said on October 28 that international tax reforms are needed because the current rules provide too much incentive for businesses to engage in economic activity offshore. Shay spoke at the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Fall Tax Division meeting in Washington, D.C.
The Obama administration’s international reform proposals (TAXDAY, 2009/05/05, W.1) take a balanced approach to address these concerns, Shay said. They include two prongs: an anti-tax evasion component; and structural changes that would affect deferral, the check-the-box rules and the foreign tax credit.
The just-introduced Foreign Account Tax Compliance Bill of 2009 (Sen 1934; TAXDAY, 2009/10/28, C.1) focuses on tax evasion. Although the bill is a product of Capitol Hill, the Treasury provided assistance, and the bill is consistent with a substantial portion of the administration’s budget proposals, according to Shay. The bill, which requires foreign financial institutions to report accounts maintained on behalf of U.S. residents, would be a substantial advance over current law, Shay declared. The proposed law focuses on financial institutions, not on countries.
As an incentive for information reporting, a failure to report would trigger 30-percent withholding. There is high compliance where there is information reporting, Shay noted. He believes it is likely that the bill will pass, although he does not foresee any action on tax reform before 2010.
The bill would also repeal the laws allowing bearer bonds and would require withholding on substitute dividends paid on credit swaps, Shay said. The bill does not contain the administration’s structural proposals, such as those affecting corporate classification.
An audience member suggested that the bill’s requirement for practitioners to report information about their clients raised attorney-client privilege concerns. Shay said that the Treasury was interested in getting comments about this and other proposals. He said there is a high threshold for requiring reporting but that it will affect some organizations.
Shay noted that the offshore bank account disclosure initiative was "very successful." It called attention to a problem and got more cases into the system. He also suggested it could lead to "appropriate prosecutions," although the initiative itself promised protection from criminal prosecution. He noted that disclosures under the initiative involved a wide range of situations, some honorable, others less honorable. The initiative was very healthy for the U.S. tax system and promoted fairness by requiring others to pay their fair share of taxes.

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Thursday, October 29, 2009

abandonment loss case

Cannot rely on a taxpayer’s statement that there was an abandonment of property. A return preparer will have the duty to make sure that there is substantiation for the abandonment in order to avoid the 6694 penalty. 6694 was not an issue in this case but it could have been if there was a return preparer for the taxpayers in this case.
A married couple was liable for the accuracy-related penalty because the wife, as president and sole shareholder of an S corporation, failed to substantiate that she was entitled to an abandonment loss under section 165(a) that the corporation allocated to her, resulting in the taxpayers' understatement of tax. The S corporation did not maintain any books or records to substantiate the abandonment loss. It was "incredible" that the wife, who was a real estate agent, would not request written documentation with respect to the purchase of the partnership. Accordingly, she acted unreasonably and not with reasonable cause and good faith
C. and Renee M. Milton v. Commissioner., U.S. Tax Court, T.C. Memo. 2009-246, (Oct. 28, 2009), U.S. Tax Court, Dkt. No. 15875-08, TC Memo. 2009-246, October 28, 2009.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
OPINION
We are asked to decide whether petitioners underreported the distributive share from RMI because RMI was not entitled to deduct an abandonment loss. Respondent argues that petitioner did not establish that an abandonment occurred entitling RMI to a deduction. Respondent also argues that the accuracy-related penalty should be imposed.
I. Abandonment Loss Deduction
We begin with the general rules for deducting abandonment losses. A taxpayer is entitled to deduct uncompensated losses during a given tax year. Sec. 165(a). Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, however, and the taxpayer must show that he or she is entitled to any deduction claimed. 4 Rule 142(a); Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940). This includes the burden of substantiation. Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 89-90 (1975), affd. per curiam 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976). The Court need not accept the taxpayer's self-serving testimony when the taxpayer fails to present corroborative evidence. Beam v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-304 (citing Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986)), affd. without published opinion 956 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1992).
A taxpayer must prove he or she owned the property abandoned to claim an abandonment loss deduction. JHK Enters., Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-79. Petitioner has not proven that RMI owned the partnership interest it purported to abandon in 2005. There is no evidence that the conversations among petitioner, Mr. Purscelley, and his father resulted in RMI's owning a partnership interest in KM Welding. Petitioner has not provided an asset purchase agreement or any other document to substantiate the transaction. Petitioner even failed to substantiate that the funds were RMI's rather than hers individually. Moreover, the purported partnership interest in KM Welding was not listed as an asset on RMI's beginning-of-the-year balance sheet for 2005. We find that RMI did not own a partnership interest in KM Welding in 2005.
In addition, the taxpayer must also establish to claim an abandonment loss that he or she (1) intended to abandon the property and (2) took affirmative action to abandon the property. Citron v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 200, 208-209 (1991). The intent to abandon and the affirmative action are to be ascertained from the facts and circumstances surrounding the abandonment. United Cal. Bank v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 437 (1964), affd. per curiam 340 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1965). An abandonment occurs where the taxpayer has relinquished the asset as well as any future claims to the asset. Tsakopoulos v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-8, affd. without published opinion 63 Fed. Appx. 400 (9th Cir. 2003). Some express manifestation of abandonment is required when the asset is an intangible property interest, such as a partnership interest. Citron v. Commissioner, supra at 209-210.
Petitioner testified that she intended to abandon her purported partnership interest in KM Welding to avoid damage to her reputation and to her business, RMI. The record does not contain any independent evidence, however, to support her alleged intent. There is no evidence, other than petitioner's self-serving testimony, that petitioner would be held liable for any debts of KM Welding. Moreover, petitioner did not provide any independent evidence of the financial health of KM Welding in 2005, the year RMI “abandoned” the partnership interest. Petitioner also did not provide evidence that KM Welding was not completing projects or timely paying its bills. In fact, KM Welding continued operations after 2005.
Furthermore, petitioner testified she decided, upon her CPA's advice, to abandon the purported partnership interest. Yet petitioner did not provide evidence of the conversations she had with her CPA. Additionally, she admitted at trial that if she received any profits from KM Welding in the future, she would report the income. Petitioner's remarks suggest that she believed there was still a possibility she would receive a return on her investment. Accordingly, we find that petitioner did not truly intend to abandon any interest in KM Welding.
Petitioner did not take any affirmative action in 2005 to abandon the purported partnership interest in KM Welding. Petitioner was unable to provide the date on which she abandoned the interest. Petitioner testified that she did not file any public document indicating that she was no longer associated with KM Welding. Additionally, there is no evidence that petitioner informed her purported partners that she was abandoning the partnership interest. We find that petitioner did not take sufficiently identifiable steps to abandon the interest in KM Welding to thereby be entitled to an abandonment loss deduction.
II. Accuracy-Related Penalty
We turn now to respondent's determination in the deficiency notice that petitioners are liable for the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) and (b)(1). Respondent has the burden of production under section 7491(c) and must come forward with sufficient evidence that it is appropriate to impose the penalty. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446-447 (2001).
A taxpayer is liable for an accuracy-related penalty for any portion of an underpayment of income tax attributable to negligence or disregard of rules and regulations, unless he or she establishes that there was reasonable cause for the underpayment and that he or she acted in good faith. Secs. 6662(a) and (b)(1), 6664(c)(1). Negligence is defined as any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of the Code and includes any failure by the taxpayer to keep adequate books and records or to substantiate items properly. Sec. 6662(c); sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.
RMI did not maintain any books or records to substantiate the abandonment loss claimed on RMI's return for 2005. We find it incredible that petitioner, who is in the business of entering into contracts, would not request written documentation of the KM Welding transaction. Furthermore, uncorroborated self-serving testimony was the only evidence petitioner presented regarding the abandonment of the purported partnership interest in KM Welding. We find that petitioners acted negligently in failing to substantiate the abandonment loss, and respondent has met his burden of production.
Notwithstanding that petitioners were negligent, they may avoid the imposition of a penalty if they are able to show that there was a reasonable cause for, and that they acted in good faith with respect to, the underpayment. See sec. 6664(c). The determination of whether the taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith is made by taking into account all the pertinent facts and circumstances. See sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.
Petitioner testified that she abandoned the KM Welding partnership interest and claimed a loss deduction for 2005 on the advice of her CPA. We do not even have the name of her CPA, nor do we know what information petitioner provided to the CPA. Petitioner failed to give us adequate evidence that she acted in good-faith reliance. Accordingly, we hold that petitioners are liable for the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) and (b)(1) for 2005.
In reaching our holding, we have considered all arguments made, and, to the extent not mentioned, we conclude that they are moot, irrelevant, or without merit.
To reflect the foregoing and the concessions of the parties,
Decision will be entered under Rule 155.

Footnotes


1
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year at issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.
2
Petitioner conceded Renee Milton, Inc. had $4,488.50 of unreported gross receipts or sales and it is not entitled to a deduction for outside services of $100,000. Respondent conceded that petitioners are entitled to $40,152 of other deductions.
3
Petitioners concede in their brief that the amount claimed should have been $90,000 rather than $100,000.
4
Sec. 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain circumstances provided the taxpayer complies with substantiation requirements, maintains all required records, and cooperates with the Commissioner's reasonable requests. Petitioners did not seek to shift the burden. In addition, petitioners have failed to substantiate the abandonment loss deduction and maintain the required records, and therefore we decline to shift the burden. See sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B).




Other annotations:

There was no recognizable loss to any partner upon the informal dissolution of a partnership because business operations were not completely terminated. The two withdrawing partners formed a new partnership and retained the clients they had been serving, so that no forfeiture of partnership interests occurred.
E.F. Neubecker, 65 TC 577, Dec. 33,549.
An investor in an oil and gas limited partnership was not entitled to a deduction for theft absent proof that he sustained a loss during the year in question. He was denied an abandonment loss deduction because he did not forfeit his partnership interest.
R. Lapin, 60 TCM 59, Dec. 46,704(M), TC Memo. 1990-343. Aff'd, CA-9 (unpublished opinion 3/12/92).

Labels:

Wednesday, October 28, 2009

IRS Small Business/Self-Employed Policies and Procedures for NFTLs first filed after CSEDs, Including Release and Refiling Considerations, SBSE-05-1009-018, (Oct. 20, 2009)

2009ARD 202-3



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE WASHINGTON. D.C. 20224

SMALL BUSINESS/SELF-EMPLOYED DIVISION

October 14, 2009
Control Number: SB/SE-05-1009-018

Expires: October 9, 2010

Impacted: IRM 5.12.2.20

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTORS, COLLECTION AREA OPERATIONS

FROM: Frederick W. Schindler /s/ Laura Hostelley (for) Director, Collection Policy

SUBJECT: Policies and Procedures for NFTLs first filed after CSEDs, Including Release and Refiling Considerations

The purpose of this memorandum is to raise awareness and provide procedures for handling rare instances of Notices of Federal Tax Lien (NFTL) filed, for the first time, on a date later than the original Collection Statute Expiration Date (CSED). These filings occur because the CSED was extended or suspended and a NFTL was not filed prior to that original CSED. The Service used the term “Portland Liens” because the issue was identified in Portland, Oregon. Beginning with this memorandum, these liens are called NFTL After Original CSED (NAOC).

Attachment I: Example A - NAOC with Correct Refile Period Calculated

Example D - NAOC/NFTL in Timeline Format

I. Release of NAOC or NFTL
Expired CSEDs render the liability and underlying statutory lien legally unenforceable. On May 2, 2008 the Automated Lien System (ALS) released liens with expired CSEDs. ALS will continue to release liens when the final CSED expires on a module. Example D, referenced above, shows a release timeline after ALS receives module satisfaction from master file (MF) or determines that a CSED extension, previously received from MF, has expired even though the NAOC (or NFTL) refile period has not expired.

II. Effectiveness of Statutory and Notice of Lien (NAOC or NFTL)
The effectiveness of the notice provided by a NAOC (or NFTL) against third party creditors is distinguishable from the viability of the underlying statutory lien. The viability of the underlying statutory lien is tied to the assessment but circumstances may make its viability distinguishable from the assessment. Placing a date in column “e” of the NFTL causes the lien to self-release saving the Service resources devoted to releasing liens when CSEDs expire. If a CSED has been extended past the date in column “e” but no refile has occurred, the liability remains viable but the statutory lien and NAOC (or NFTL) have been extinguished. When the statutory lien has been extinguished a revocation of release is needed to reestablish it before a new NAOC (or NFTL) can be filed. If the statutory lien remains viable only a new NAOC (or NFTL) need be filed.

The underlying statutory lien is extinguished if :
a. The liability has been fully satisfied by payment

b. The liability becomes legally unenforceable due to no time remaining on the original statute collection period (or longer period if a suspension or extension)

c. A release occurs due to the self-releasing language on Form 668(Y)(c) even though the CSED has been extended or suspended


The NAOC or NFTL is valid if both :
a. The statutory lien is valid, and

b. The NAOC or NFTL refile period has not expired (whichever refile period applies section 6232(g)(3)(A) or section 6323(g)(3)(B) )


The NAOC or NFTL is not valid if either:
a. The statutory lien is not valid, or

b. The refile period has expired whether or not there is a date in column “e”


When a NAOC or NFTL is not valid, the Service must release that NAOC or NFTL within 30 days of the underlying liability becoming unenforceable or satisfied.

Attachment I: Example B - NAOC with Incorrect “Refile By” Date in Column “e”

Example D - NAOC/NFTL in Timeline Format

III. Repair Procedures for NAOC or NFTL with Expired Refile Period
No date in column “e”
If the CSED has not expired

File a new NAOC or NFTL

Attachment I: Example C - NAOC with NA for “Refile By” Date in Column “e”

Date in column “e”

If the CSED has not expired

File a revocation of release

File a new NAOC or NFTL

Attachment I: Example B - NAOC with Incorrect “Refile By” Date in Column “e”

For questions on the validity of NAOC or NFTL contact Advisory or Counsel.

IV. Table 1: Computing “Refile By” Dates for NFTL and NAOC

Refile Period
“Refile By” Date

IRC § 6323(g)(3)
Last Day for Refiling


From
Until
(a/k/a column “e”)


First 10 year period after assessment * **
The first day of a one year period ending with the date calculated to the right
10 years and 30 days after assessment
10 years and 30 days after assessment


Second period for refile
10 years after the date calculated above
10 years after the date calculated above
10 years after date calculated above


Third period for refile
20 years after date calculated in first row
20 years after date calculated in first row
20 years after date calculated in first row


REMINDER: Use the “refile by” date calculated using the table above even if the CSED precedes the “refile by” date.

* NOTE: If the first refile period begins in January, February, or March of a leap year, use IRM Exhibit 5.12.2-2 to obtain the refile period ending date. For questions on these calculations contact Area Counsel to ensure correct refile period calculation.

** NOTE: When encountering old cases, NFTL, NAOC, or judgments involving a tax liability assessed prior to the Revenue Reconciliation Act , effective November 5, 1990, contact Advisory and Counsel for assistance in determining the correct refile period.


If you have any questions, please call me or a member of your staff may contact Christine Kalcevic.

Attachment

cc: Director, Advisory, Insolvency, and Quality www.irs.gov

ATTACHMENT I
Example A NAOC with Correct Refile Period Calculated

1. Assessment date: 07-10-1998

2. Normal CSED: 07-10-2008

3. Prior to 07-10-2008 the Taxpayer submits an offer-in-compromise. The Service accepts the offer for processing by signing the completed Form 656 on 05-10-2008. Beginning on this date, the offer in compromise is pending. The Service accepts the offer in compromise on 11-10-2009.

4. During the time the offer-in-compromise was pending, the running of collection limitation period was suspended. In this case the collection limitation period was suspended for 18 months.

5. New CSED: 01-10-2010

6. NFTL (now known as “NAOC”) filed (for first time): 05-10-2009

7. Refiling Period: 08/10/2017 through 08/09/2018




Assessment
CSED
Original
Refile By
New
CSED
NAOC
Filed
ALS
Release
NAOC
Refile By



A
07-10-1998
07-10-2008
08-09-2008
01-10-2010
05-10-2009
01-10-2010
08-09-2018



Example B NAOC with Incorrect “Refile By” Date in Column “e”
Items 1- 6 are the same as Example A:

Assessment date: 07-10-1998

Normal CSED: 07-10-2008

Prior to 07-10-2008 the Taxpayer submits an offer-in-compromise. The Service accepts the offer for processing by signing the completed Form 656 on 05-10-2008. Beginning on this date, the offer in compromise is pending. The Service accepts the offer in compromise on 11-10-2009.

During the time the offer-in-compromise was pending, the running of collection limitation period was suspended. In this case the collection limitation period was suspended for 18 months.

New CSED: 01-10-2010

NFTL (now known as “NAOC”) filed for first time: 05-10-2009

“Refile by” date entered in column “e” is 08-09-2009 (incorrectly calculated by adding twelve months and thirty days to the original 10-year collection limitation period, thinking that was the end of the refile period)

Statutory lien is extinguished as a consequence of the self-release language contained on the NAOC. The lien is released as of 08-09-2009 even though the collection limitation period remains open until 01-10-2010.

Revocation of release filed (and mailed to taxpayer) 10-01-2009 to reinstate the statutory lien

New NAOC filed 10-02-2009 to reestablish the “notice” of lien against the four classes of creditors enumerated in section 6323(a) . See General Background. Thus, the new NAOC is effective as of 10-02-2009 in competing against these four interests. The effectiveness of the notice does not revert back to 05-10-2009, the date the NAOC was filed.

Correct Refiling Period is 08/10/2017 through 08/09/2018




Assessment
CSED
Original
Refile By
New
CSED
NAOC
Filed
ALS
Release
NAOC Refile By








05-10-2009
* 08-09-2009

B
07-10-1998
07-10-2008
08-09-2008
01-10-2010






* 10-02-2009
01-10-2010
08-09-2018


* Revocation required and filed 10-01-2009


Example C NAOC with NA for “Refile By” Date in Column “e”
1. Original Assessment: 04-23-1992

2. Normal CSED: 04-23-2002

3. 2 bankruptcies and the taxpayer's innocent spouse claim and appeal resulted in an 11-year CSED suspension to: 04-23-2013

4. Lien (NAOC) filed (for first time): 02-15-2004

5. Refile period: 05-24-2011 through 05-23-2012 (using the second ten year period after assessment)

6. NAOC shows “NA” in column “e” and the notice contains the standard self-release language used in NFTLs since 1982

7. NAOC not refiled during refiling period. The lien did not self-release because “NA” or nothing in column “e” makes the self-release language inoperable.

8. On 06-01-2012 a new NAOC filed and this includes 05-23-2022 as the refile by date in column “e”. The new NAOC protects the Service's priority position in relation to other creditors enumerated in section 6323(a) as of 06-01-2012, not 02-15-2004 (NOTE: Revocation of release was not filed because the underlying statutory lien remained viable)




Assessment
CSED
Original
Refile By
New
CSED
NAOC
Filed
ALS
Release
NAOC
Refile By








02-15-2004
*
*

C
04-23-1992
04-23-2002
05-23-2002
04-23-2013






○ 06-01-2012
04-23-2013
05-23-2022


○Second refile period ended 05-23-2012


PDF Version of Example DPDF Version of Example D

Monday, October 26, 2009

FIN 48

IR- 2009-95

Internal Revenue Service: Remarks of IRS Commissioner Shulman: 2009 National Association of Corporate Directors Corporate Governance Conference


PREPARED REMARKS OF COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE DOUGLAS H. SHULMAN
BEFORE THE 2009 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CONFERENCE WASHINGTON, DC OCTOBER 19, 2009
IR-2009-95 , Oct. 19, 2009

WASHINGTON — Thank you for that warm introduction and welcome.

I realize that the IRS Commissioner has not customarily addressed the NACD's corporate governance conference…but what I want to discuss with you this afternoon is the important role that boards of directors can play in overseeing tax risk and tax strategies of corporations. After all, taxes are one of the biggest expenses of a corporation, so how they are managed is very important to most corporations.

Clearly, corporate boards of directors play an incredibly important role in the vibrancy of businesses and our economy. Boards are a source of creative ideas, strategic thinking, and, importantly, governance and oversight. Boards hold management accountable, and in that role, understanding the risk posture of the company is critically important.

So today, I want to share with you some observations of what I have seen since I've taken the helm of the organization responsible for collecting 96% of all federal receipts - around $2.5 trillion.

To begin, I understand that many of you - actually most of you - are not tax experts and you were not installed on the board because of your tax expertise. You bring other critical skills, experiences and expertise to the boardroom.

And I also understand that even with all of your sophistication, expertise and experience in business and financial affairs, it's difficult to understand the tax consequences of a complicated business transaction, such as a tax-free reorganization or a hedging transaction, let alone the corporation's overall tax profile as it relates to federal, state and international taxes. That's why you need to have strong tax departments and outside tax advisors. After all, you have finance experts to help you understand the economic value of hedging transactions, and you need tax experts to help you understand the myriad and complex tax issues facing your company.

Now, my motivation to create this dialogue with you is based in part on personal and professional experience. I moved from the business world where I interacted with boards… to FINRA, the largest independent securities regulator in the U.S. ….to the IRS, where I am focusing on major trends, such as the globalization of tax administration, and innovative ways to strengthen and improve our tax system. In all of these roles, I have seen the importance of board oversight of major areas of risk.

So, I know first hand that in the post-Sarbanes Oxley world, corporations have invested significant time and resources on compliance issues and internal controls. In the tax arena, some have instituted regular meetings between the Audit Committee and the tax director to ensure an open dialogue.

As I mentioned earlier, tax issues should remain on your radar screen - and for good reason. It's one of the biggest expenses on your income statement. In addition, a number of public companies have reported material weaknesses in internal controls related to taxes. Tax strategies can also present a financial and restatement risk, and sometimes when the cases are high profile, a significant risk to corporate reputations. In today's business climate, the general public has little tolerance for overly aggressive tax planning that can be viewed as corporations playing tax games.

So, although the complexity of the tax code may make your eyes glaze over, Board members - like you -are critically important to making sure that the tax system works well and is worthy of the confidence of the American people.

But how can you increase your oversight of tax compliance given the limited amount of time you have available and the competing business issues you face?

Well, you probably know or could figure out, that the IRS conducts risk assessments of its own when determining how to use its time and resources and whom to audit. Similarly, the board of directors can assess its corporation's tax risk profile, internal controls, and relationship with its corporate tax department, to help determine the tax matters of which it should be aware.

Now, we recognize that many businesses are trying to get it right. Positions taken in tax returns may be well-grounded and taken in good faith. Other tax positions taken may be more aggressive and use elaborately structured transactions or arrangements to push tax planning up to the edge, or beyond acceptable bounds.

Enter FIN 48, which establishes the financial statement accounting for uncertain tax positions, including recognizing and measuring their effect on financial statements.

Under FIN 48, companies must identify their material uncertain tax positions. They must quantify the company's maximum exposure and estimated likelihood of winning or losing the issue if challenged by the IRS. And they must record as a liability a specified amount of money relating to these uncertain tax positions. In other words, FIN 48 is a very significant window into tax risk, liability and management in your company.

FIN 48 paints a picture of tax risk by indicating how much money a corporation has to book in tax reserves to reflect the risk should one or more of its tax positions go south.

But let's get behind the reserve numbers for a moment. What are they telling you - the board directors - beyond the dollars in the tax reserve?

They're saying that the audit committee needs to know and influence what tax posture the tax planners are taking. They and you need to know whether that multi-million - or in some cases multi-billon-dollar bet - you and your company are making could be too aggressive and therefore risky.

So where does that bring us? What are the next steps?

Before I get to that, I want to be clear about what I “do” intend and “don't” intend in this dialogue.

We don't intend to second-guess legitimate and thoughtful business decision-making by corporate leaders. And we don't expect that you will always agree with us on identifying and quantifying the risk of various tax positions. But we do want to engage corporate leaders about their roles and responsibilities in conducting appropriate assessment and oversight of tax risk.

I am suggesting that you, the leaders of your organizations, should have a mechanism to oversee tax risk as part of your governance process. For example you might want to:

Set a threshold confidence level for taking a tax position…

Discourage or eliminate opinion shopping by tax departments by having an independent tax firm, which has some direct dialogue with the board of directors, review major tax positions …

Specifically address transfer pricing and the relative profit allocated to low-tax jurisdictions, and make sure they reflect real economic contributions made in those jurisdictions.

And diving down a little deeper, here are some questions you might ask of your tax director and your external auditors relating to FIN 48:

What was the process for identifying uncertain tax positions and how do you know all material issues have been identified?

How did you go about determining the maximum tax exposure relating to each uncertain tax position? What makes you comfortable that it accurately reflects your maximum exposure?

How did you go about quantifying the likelihood of winning or losing uncertain tax positions? Do you plan to litigate the issue if the IRS challenges the position? Does the external auditor or tax advisor agree with the tax director's assessment?

Could the company be subject to potential penalties, such as for underpayment of tax, negligence or worse? If so, are they appropriately recorded, and perhaps more important, what does this say about how aggressive the company's position is regarding those issues?

There are already some IRS programs in place that help provide greater certainty and can give a board more comfort that there won't be second guessing down the road. For example, our compliance assurance program, or CAP where we agree on issues with the taxpayer before a corporate return is filed, envisions full disclosure by the taxpayer in exchange for real time tax certainty. And the Advance Pricing Agreement program, where we agree with a taxpayer on pricing methodology before a return is filed, provides certainty in the complex and uncertain area of transfer pricing.

Now, we're not the only government thinking about the notion that corporate taxpayers that employ sound management and governance practices on tax matters are more likely to be compliant.

One example is Australia. The Australian Tax Office publishes a Governance Guide for Board Members and Directors that suggests useful questions - similar to the ones I just posed - that a corporate director can ask of management.

Some of the Australian Tax Office's questions include: Is there a material difference between the losses reported for accounting purposes and the losses claimed for tax purposes? If so, can the difference be satisfactorily explained? Is the structure and financing for your business or a major transaction complicated, perhaps more complex than necessary to achieve the commercial objectives? These questions give you a flavor of what some other countries are thinking about and doing in the corporate governance area.

On a broader scale, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has charted a worldwide trend of increased boardroom attention to issues of taxation. A recent guidance document outlines good corporate governance principals in relation to tax, based on advice from governments around the world.

In summary, my main observation to share with you is this: Taxes are an important expense, and like any important expense, management responsible will try to control it. In the case of taxes, controlling it can expose the company to challenge, which can result in reputational damage and perhaps large, unexpected expenses. So you need to understand how management controls this expense and how it decides how aggressive to be. You also need to be certain that reporting is effective.

Tax expense in this sense is no different from other expenses. Manage it too loosely and you give up profit. Manage it too aggressively and there are bad consequences. You, the board, have to oversee how management manages it. That means some level of understanding, a set of policy principles and then a control system of reporting that assures you that the policy is being carried out.

My goal here today was to start a discussion about the board of directors' role in overseeing tax risk. I encourage you to have the dialogue, and offer the IRS as a resource as you continue to evolve your thinking about this topic. At the end of the day, my proposition is that the board needs to have the tools, not to do tax planning, but to oversee tax strategies and risks.

I see my time is up today. I hope it was a good start and that this beneficial dialogue will continue and mature in the weeks and months ahead. Thank you.

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