Saturday, January 31, 2009

Meaning of "reckless" in 6694(b)

The $5,000 per position penalty of 6694(b)applies if the return preparer is "reckless"

There is a great deal of judicial authority on the term "reckless" as equivalent the term "willfulness" in determining the trusft fund penalty under section 6672. Much of the concept of "reckless disregard" from judicial precedent helps define the term "reckless" under section 6694(b).

I have selected just one case, below, to make the point. The courts say that when a person responsible for the payroll taxes has a "reckless disregard" for the payment of the payroll taxes, that person meets the "willfulness" requirement of the 6672 statute. I have had cases where the IRS has made that argument. The "failure to take steps" to make sure that payroll taxes is being paid is really a "due diligence" standard. That the my main point. If a return preparer has not made any effort to determine if, for example, an expense or deduction meets the necessary requirements of a tax regulation or other published authority, that is a lack of due diligence and therefore is likely to be treated as "reckless" within the meaning of section 6694(b).

Keep in mind that the IRS examiners should be expected to be aggressive. An aggressive IRS examiner could easily say that the failure to monitor substantiation is "reckless." The biggest trap for the unwary tax return preparer is when the return preparer relies on every number provided by a client without verifying the quality of the data and the technical requirements for that data. Although the final regulations say you do not have to audit your client, you run the risk of draconian penalties when you do not use your maximum due dilligence to qualify the data for substantiation and technical support.




89-2 USTC ¶9581] J. Allen Dougherty, Plaintiff v. The United States, Defendant


In order for a "responsible person" to be liable under section 6672 he must have acted "willfully" in failing to collect, truthfully account for or pay over the delinquent and unpaid Federal employment taxes. Willfulness for purposes of this statute has been defined as "a deliberate choice voluntarily, consciously, and intentionally made to pay other creditors instead of paying the Government." White v. United States [67-1 USTC ¶9250 ], 178 Ct. Cl. 765, 778, 779, 372 F.2d 513, 521 (1967). Mere knowledge of a past delinquency does not impose strict liability on a responsible officer for delinquencies during his tenure. Godfrey, 748 F.2d at 1578. In addition, negligence in determining a tax delinquency is insufficient to constitute willfulness. Bauer, 211 Ct. Cl. at 289, 543 F.2d at 150; see also Bolding, 215 Ct. Cl. at 163, 565 F.2d at 672.

The "Reckless Disregard" Standard of Willfulness

"Willful conduct may also include a reckless disregard of an 'obvious and known risk . . . that taxes might not be remitted'." Godfrey, 748 F.2d at 1577 (citations omitted). "[I]f a responsible officer knows that the corporation has recently committed such a delinquency and knows that since then its affairs have continued to deteriorate, he runs the risk of being held liable if he fails to take any steps either to ascertain, before signing checks, what the state of the tax withholding account is, or to institute effective financial controls to guard against non-payment." Wright v. United States [87-1 USTC ¶9130 ], 809 F.2d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Leuschner [64-2 USTC ¶9742 ], 336 F.2d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1964). However, "merely because a corporate officer has check-signing responsibilities and his corporation is in financial trouble, it does not follow that he can be held liable for any and all failures to pay withholding taxes." Wright, 809 F.2d at 428. Even considering plaintiff's version of events, the record establishes that plaintiff acted willfully in that, during the tax quarters at issue, he recklessly disregarded his duty to collect and pay over VELCO's Federal employment taxes and ignored the risks that VELCO's Federal employment taxes would not be paid. Wright [87-1 USTC ¶9130 ], 809 F.2d 425.

In Wright v. United States [87-1 USTC ¶9130 ], 809 F.2d 425, 427-428 (7th Cir. 1987), the Seventh Circuit, found that the plaintiff in that case had acted willfully under section 6672 by acting with recklessness. The Wright court distinguished its case from Godfrey:

We emphasize that merely because a corporate officer has check-signing responsibilities and his corporation is in financial trouble, it does not follow that he can be held liable for any and all failures to pay withholding taxes. Nor have we any quarrel with Godfrey v. United States [84-2 USTC ¶9974 ], 748 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1984), which held that mere knowledge of a past delinquency does not impose strict liability on a responsible officer for delinquencies during his tenure. But if a responsible officer knows that the corporation has recently committed such a delinquency and knows that since then its affairs have continued to deteriorate, he runs the risk of being held liable if he fails to take any step either to ascertain, before signing checks, what the state of the tax withholding account is, or to institute effective financial controls to guard against nonpayment. See Hornsby v. IRS, supra; United States v. Leuschner [64-2 USTC ¶9742 ], 336 F.2d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1964). Wright did neither of these things.
Id. at 428.

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Friday, January 30, 2009

Negligence equals section 6694(b) penalty

The taxpayer in the Coleman case, below, was filed on January 29, 2009. This case illustrates some common tax return issues that you will see. The taxpayer was hit with the 20% negligence penalty. My point in presenting this case is that IF this person’s tax return was prepared by a professional tax return preparer, it is my opinion that the 6694(b) $5,000 penalty for being “reckless” would apply.
The taxpayer was not liable on a mortgage on her mother's residence was not entitled to deduct mortgage interest on the property until the individual inherited it following her mother's death. Prior to her mother's death, the individual was neither the equitable nor the beneficial owner of the property. The taxpayer did not occupy the property or have the unilateral right to make improvements to it, did not bear any risk of loss, and had no duty to maintain, insure or pay taxes, assessments or charges with respect to the property. Accordingly, the taxpayer could only deduct the portion of the mortgage interest paid after she inherited the property. An individual who was not liable on a mortgage on her mother's residence was not entitled to deduct mortgage interest on the property until the individual inherited it following her mother's death. Prior to her mother's death, the individual was neither the equitable nor the beneficial owner of the property. The individual did not occupy the property or have the unilateral right to make improvements to it, did not bear any risk of loss, and had no duty to maintain, insure or pay taxes, assessments or charges with respect to the property. Accordingly, the individual could only deduct the portion of the mortgage interest paid after she inherited the property. The taxpayer was not entitled to a theft loss deduction for property stolen from a church at which she served as the pastor. The individual did not establish that she owned the property that was stolen and that she personally sustained the loss. The taxpayer was allowed only a limited charitable contribution deduction for amounts she either donated to, or expended on behalf of, a church at which she served as the pastor. The individual was denied a charitable contribution deduction for amounts under $250 for which she lacked substantiation, and for amounts in excess of $250 or for which she did not obtain the required contemporaneous written acknowledgment from the organization
The Coleman case deals with the 163 mortgage deduction, the 165 theft deduction and the section 170 deduction. These are all common issues. When you read this case think about whether you would have checked the guidance of the applicable statutes and regulations. Without doing that you would, in my opinion, flunk the “reasonable basis” standard for disclosed positions in order to avoid the 6694 penalty. If an IRS examiner were looking to assess the 6694(b) penalty, the total penalties in this case would be $15,000.


[T.C. Summary Opinion 2009-16]
Lisa R. Coleman v. Commissioner.

Docket No. 12085-07S 16591-07S . Filed January 29, 2009.

DEAN, Special Trial Judge: These consolidated cases were heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect when the petitions were filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decisions to be entered are not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case. Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent section references are to the Code in effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

For 2004 and 2005 respondent determined deficiencies in petitioner's Federal income taxes of $3,090 and $3,409 and accuracy-related penalties under section 6662(a) of $618 and $681.80, respectively. Respondent disallowed petitioner's claimed deductions for "Schedule A taxes" of $3,370 and her $19,441 charitable contribution deduction for 2004. 1 For 2005 respondent disallowed petitioner's claimed $5,993 theft loss deduction, her $11,396 mortgage interest deduction, and $10,561 of her claimed $11,061 charitable contribution deduction.

For 2004 and 2005 respondent concedes that petitioner is entitled to deductions for charitable contributions of $1,239.26 2 and $3,014 3 and "Schedule A taxes" of $3,370 and $3,582, respectively.

The issues remaining for decision are whether petitioner is: (1) Entitled to claim charitable contribution deductions in excess of those respondent allowed; (2) entitled to claim a mortgage interest deduction of $11,396 for 2005; (3) entitled to claim a theft loss deduction of $5,933 for 2005; and (4) liable for the accuracy-related penalty for each year.


Background

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts and the exhibits received into evidence are incorporated herein by reference. When the petitions were filed, petitioner resided in California.



Charitable Contributions
During the years at issue, petitioner was employed as a law enforcement technician with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. She also served as the pastor of Bethel, which is a member church of Mount Sinai Holy Church of America, Inc. Petitioner made expenditures on behalf of Bethel by cash or check For example, petitioner purchased a 15-passenger van for use by Bethel so that she could pick up church members for Sunday school and morning worship. The van bears Bethel's name and is parked on Bethel's premises, but it is titled in petitioner's name. In addition, petitioner purchased a "250 foot black rod [sic] iron fence" that runs the perimeter of Bethel's property.

On petitioner's Schedules A, Itemized Deductions, attached to her Forms 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, petitioner claimed deductions for charitable contributions of $19,441 and $11,061 for 2004 and 2005, respectively. As reflected on petitioner's 2004 Schedule A, her charitable contribution deduction consisted of gifts by cash or check of $18,379, gifts other than by cash or check of $500, and a $562 carryover from 2003. As reflected on petitioner's 2005 Schedule A, her charitable contribution deduction consisted of gifts by cash or check of $10,561 and gifts other than by cash or check of $500. In the notices of deficiency for 2004 and 2005, respondent disallowed "Cash Contributions" of $19,441 and $10,561, respectively. Respondent disallowed petitioner's claimed "Cash Contributions" because petitioner "did not verify that the amounts shown were contributions, and paid; [therefore,] the amounts are not deductible."



Mortgage Interest Deduction
On April 25, 2006, letters of administration were filed naming petitioner as the legal representative of her mother's estate. Petitioner's mother, Lula Mae Coleman, died intestate on August 15, 2005. In 2005 petitioner made some payments to the entities holding mortgages on her parent's home at "319 E Newfield St". Petitioner, however, has lived in her home at "E 90th" for over 11 years and resided at her "E. 90th" home during 2005. On petitioner's 2005 Schedule A, she claimed an $11,396 mortgage interest deduction for the interest paid with respect to the mortgages on her parent's home at "319 E Newfield St". Respondent disallowed petitioner's claimed mortgage interest deduction because she did not establish that the amount was her interest expense and that she paid it.



Theft Loss Deduction
On October 27, 2005, petitioner filed an incident report for a burglary at Bethel. On the incident report, the police officer recorded petitioner's statement that two computers, including monitors and printers, worth $2,000 were stolen. Petitioner also submitted a "Supplementary Loss Report", on which she claimed a total additional loss of $10,740. Petitioner claimed that the additional loss items consisted of musical equipment, chaffing dishes, roasters, a "T.V.", computer equipment, food, clothes, toys, and cases of paper.

On petitioner's 2005 Schedule A, petitioner described the event as a "HOME BURGLARY" in which various household items with a basis of $19,145 and a $10,148 fair market value were stolen. Petitioner claimed a $5,933 "TOTAL" theft loss that respondent disallowed because she did not establish that a theft occurred and that she sustained a loss.


Discussion




I. Burden of Proof
The Commissioner's determinations in a notice of deficiency are presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden to prove that the determinations are in error. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). But the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to the issue and the taxpayer has satisfied certain conditions. See sec. 7491(a)(1). Petitioner has not alleged that section 7491(a) applies, and she has neither complied with the substantiation requirements nor maintained all required records. See sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). Accordingly, the burden of proof remains on her.



II. Charitable Contribution Deductions
Petitioner testified that Bethel was in need of repairs when she "received" it and that she "put a lot of money into the church because I think that that's my responsibility as the pastor of the church to make sure that the church is functioning and in decent order." According to petitioner, she had to rent equipment, charge things to her Home Depot account, and hire men to perform repairs. "[She] had to pay that on behalf of the church because the church did not have a fund in order to do that. That's where [her] contributions came from."

Unreimbursed expenditures made incident to the rendition of services to a qualifying charitable organization may constitute a deductible contribution. Rockefeller v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 178, 183 (1981), affd. 676 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1982); McCollum v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1978-435; Miller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1975-279; sec. 1.170A-1(g), Income Tax Regs. But deductions for charitable contributions are allowed "only if verified under regulations prescribed by the Secretary." Sec. 170(a).

A. Monetary Contributions of Less Than $250

In pertinent part, section 1.170A-13(f)(1), Income Tax Regs., provides that separate contributions of less than $250 are not subject to the "contemporaneous written acknowledgment" requirement of section 170(f)(8) regardless of whether the sum of the contributions to an organization equals $250 or more. Rather, monetary charitable contributions of less than $250 must be substantiated by a canceled check; a receipt from the organization that shows the name of the donee, the date of the contribution, and the amount thereof; or "other reliable written records" that show the name of the donee, the date of the contribution, and the amount thereof. Sec. 1.170A-13(a)(1), Income Tax Regs. A letter or other communication from the organization that acknowledges the receipt of a contribution and that shows the date and amount thereof constitutes a receipt. Id.

Sec. 1.170A-13(a)(2), Income Tax Regs., provides that the reliability of "other reliable written records" is determined on the basis of all of the facts and circumstances. Factors indicative of reliability include but are not limited to: (1) The contemporaneousness of the writing evidencing the contribution; (2) the regularity of the taxpayer's recordkeeping procedures, e.g., a contemporaneous diary entry stating the amount and date of the contribution and the name of the organization that is made by a taxpayer who regularly makes such diary entries; and (3) in the case of a de minimis contribution, any written or other evidence from the organization evidencing the contribution that would not otherwise constitute a receipt (including a "token" traditionally associated with the organization and regularly given by the organization to persons making cash donations). Id.

Petitioner has submitted into evidence a log of the 2004 and 2005 disputed monetary contributions of less than $250 and copies of the following canceled checks:



Check

Date No. Payee Amount Description

12/03
1 8632 Cash $20.00 Donation

Sparkletts
1/04 8645 Water 15.25 Water

1/04 8650 Sam's Club 170.51 Supplies

Mr.
2/04 8684 Barrueta 55.00 Repair-elec

3/04 8705 OfficeMax 25.00 Supplies

U.S.
4/04 8740 Postmaster 34.00 Postage

Sparkletts
5/04 8749 Water 104.00 Water

4/04 8756 OfficeMax 66.00 Supplies

6/04 8764 OfficeMax 67.00 Supplies

6/04 8774 Gas Co. 30.00 Utilities

Sparkletts
6/04 8781 Water 10.00 Water

6/04 8787 Sam's Club 100.03 Supplies

Sparkletts
8/04 8833 Water 128.00 Water

9/04 8850 Sam's Club 161.55 Supplies

U.S.
11/04 8870 Postmaster 34.00 Postage

Bishop
4/05 9034 Batten 2 100.00 Donation

Pastor
4/05 9187 Johnson 2 50.00 Donation

Total 1,170.34

1 This contribution was made in 2003 and thus is not
deductible as a charitable contribution for 2004. See
sec. 170(a)(1). Respondent's disallowance thereof is
sustained.

2 Respondent disallowed the deductions for these
contributions, reasoning that the payments fail the "to or
for the use of" the organization requirement, see
sec. 170(c), since the checks were deposited into the
individuals' personal banking accounts rather than an
account of a charitable organization. Since petitioner has
not proven that the payments were "to or for the use of" a
charitable organization rather than for the personal use
of the individuals, respondent's disallowance thereof is
sustained. See Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472,
478-486 (1990).


Petitioner's log also lists the following cash contributions of less than $250 for 2004, which respondent disputes:



Payment
Date method Recipient Amount Description

2/04 Cash Los Angeles Mission $35.55 Gift

8/04 Cash Los Angeles Mission 26.55 Gift

10/04 Cash Los Angeles Mission 45.00 Gift

12/04 Cash Los Angeles Mission 37.17 Gift

8/04 Cash March of Dimes 50.00 Gift

Neighborhood curb
11/04 Cash painting 10.00 Gift

3/04 Cash Easter Seals 75.00 Gift

United Negro College
6/04 Cash Fund 100.00 Gift

United Negro College
8/04 Cash Fund 150.00 Gift

Total 529.27


Petitioner has not provided receipts substantiating the foregoing charitable contributions. Petitioner's entitlement to her charitable contribution deductions therefore hinges on the canceled checks or her "other reliable written record".

The Court finds that neither the notations on the canceled checks nor the payees of the canceled checks prove that petitioner paid the expenses on Bethel's behalf. Indeed, the subject matter of the canceled checks indicates that the expenditures might be nondeductible personal expenses. See sec. 262(a).

With respect to the log, it is dated "11/22/06" and appears to have been created by petitioner's return preparer, Mr. Applewhite. Thus, petitioner has failed to establish the contemporaneous nature of the log, and she has not established that she regularly and contemporaneously recorded her contributions in the log. See sec. 1.170A-13(a)(2)(i)(A) and (B), Income Tax Regs. The Court accords little probative weight to the log.

Without other reliable evidence to substantiate her deductions for charitable contributions of less than $250 for 2004 and 2005, the Court finds that petitioner is not entitled to claim her deductions. In addition, the Court will not apply the Cohan rule to estimate a deductible amount. See Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930); see also Bond v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 32, 41 (1993) ("the reporting requirements [of section 1.170A-13, Income Tax Regs.,] are directory and not mandatory."); Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743 (1985) (an estimate must have a reasonable evidentiary basis). Without reliable evidence upon which to base an estimate, an allowance here would amount to "unguided largesse." Williams v. United States, 245 F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir. 1957). Accordingly, respondent's determinations are sustained.

B. Donations of Money or Property of $250 or More

As is relevant here, section 170(f)(8) provides that no deduction is allowed for all or part of any charitable contribution of $250 or more unless the contribution is substantiated by a contemporaneous written acknowledgment from the organization. See also sec. 1.170A-13(f)(1), Income Tax Regs. A written acknowledgment is contemporaneous if it is obtained by the taxpayer on or before the earlier of the date the taxpayer files the original return for the taxable year of the contribution or the due date (including extensions) for filing the original return for the year. Sec. 170(f)(8)(C); sec. 1.170A-13(f)(3), Income Tax Regs. The written acknowledgment must state the amount of cash and a description (but not necessarily the value) of any property other than cash that the taxpayer donated and whether the organization provided any consideration to the taxpayer in exchange for the donation. Sec. 170(f)(8)(B)(i) and (ii); sec. 1.170A-13(f)(2)(i) and (ii), Income Tax Regs.

To substantiate the following disputed 2004 deductions for charitable contributions of $250 or more, petitioner has submitted into evidence a log of her contributions and certain letters:



Payment
Date method Recipient Amount Description

"various"
2004 Cash Bethel $18,293.71 Gift

"various"
2004 Cash Bethel 4,091.20 Van payments

2004 Cash Bethel 794.39 Van insurance

7 bags
Dorothy Brown clothing, TV,
4/04 Property School 500.00 household items

10 bags
Dorothy Brown clothing, TV,
7/04 Property School 500.00 household items

Total 24,179.30


To substantiate the following disputed 2005 deductions for charitable contributions of $250 or more, petitioner has submitted into evidence a log of her contributions, copies of canceled checks, certain letters, and photographs:



Payment
Date method Recipient Amount Description

Check No.
9/05 9141 Mr. Degado $1000.00 Repair-church

Check No. Bishop
10/05 9151 Batten 300.00 Donation

Wrought
"various" iron black
2005 Cash Bethel 9,000.00 fence

"various" Tractor
2005 Cash Bethel 1,000.00 mower

"various" Van
2005 Cash Bethel 3,854.68 payments

Van
2005 Bethel 1,124.63 insurance

7 bags
clothing, TV,
Dorothy household
4/05 Property Brown School 500.00 items

Total 16,779.31


Although petitioner's log shows a $13,038 charitable contribution for 2004, petitioner has provided three letters purporting to substantiate cash contributions of $18,293.71 to Bethel during 2004. 4 A letter from Bishop Coward, dated June 3, 2008, alleges that petitioner paid $18,293.71 in 2004 for "major repair work on the property". A letter from Pastor Kincy, dated January 14, 2005, alleges that petitioner made a "contribution of $18,293.71" in 2004. 5 A letter from Secretary Jackson, dated December 4, 2006, alleges the same.

Aside from other defects, 6 the three letters and the log fail to satisfy the requirement that the organization provide a statement as to whether or not the organization provided any goods or services in consideration for the donation. See sec. 170(f)(8)(B)(ii); sec. 1.170A-13(f)(2)(ii), Income Tax Regs. Therefore, petitioner's $18,293.71 charitable contribution deduction is not allowable. See Kendrix v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-9 (disallowing the taxpayer's charitable contribution deductions because the requirements of section 170(f)(8)(B)(ii) were not satisfied since the "receipts" did not state whether the church provided any goods or services in consideration for the contributions); Castleton v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-58, affd. 188 Fed. Appx. 561 (9th Cir. 2006).

Petitioner cannot deduct the $1,000 charitable contribution for a tractor lawnmower that she allegedly donated to Bethel because neither the log nor the letter, dated February 5, 2007, evidencing the contribution satisfies the contemporaneous acknowledgment requirements of section 1.170A-13(f)(2) and (3), Income Tax Regs.

Petitioner cannot deduct the $300 payment to Bishop Batten because neither the log nor the canceled check evidencing the payment satisfies the acknowledgment requirements of section 1.170A-13(f)(2) and (3), Income Tax Regs. In addition, since the check was deposited into Bishop Batten's personal bank account rather than an account of a charitable organization, petitioner has not proven that the payment was "to or for the use of" a charitable organization rather than for the personal use of the individual. See sec. 170(c); Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 478-486 (1990).

Petitioner cannot deduct the items donated to the Dorothy Brown School because the log evidencing the contribution does not satisfy the contemporaneous acknowledgment requirements of section 1.170A-13(f)(2) and (3), Income Tax Regs.

Petitioner submitted no other records and did not present testimony from any other representative of Bethel to substantiate her $18,293.71 cash contributions, her donation of the tractor lawnmower, or her $300 payment to Bishop Batten. Similarly, petitioner provided no other evidence to substantiate her charitable contributions to the Dorothy Brown School. Accordingly, the Court will not apply the Cohan rule to estimate a deductible amount. See Williams v. United States, 245 F.2d at 560; Vanicek v. Commissioner 85 T.C. at 742-743; see also Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d at 543-544; Bond v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. at 41. Respondent's determinations are sustained.

Petitioner has provided a "receipt", a letter from Bethel, canceled checks, the log, and photographs of the old and new fence to substantiate payments of $10,100 to a Mr. Degado for her purchase of the black wrought iron fence. The so-called receipt is dated September 16, 2005, and purports to be from Juan Degado. The receipt was not issued by Mr. Degado. The receipt was created on June 2, 2008, by the new owner of the fencing business based upon information supplied by petitioner and, allegedly, by one of the workers who installed the fence. 7 The Court, therefore, accords little weight to the receipt.

The letter from Bethel concerning the fence is dated October 1, 2005, and is signed by "Elder L.C. Kincy, Pastor [and] Sis Angelique Jackson, Secretary". The letter acknowledges a $9,000 donation for a "250 foot black rod [sic] iron fence". The letter, however, fails to satisfy the requirement that the organization provide a statement as to whether the organization provided any goods or services in consideration for the donation. See sec. 170(f)(8)(B)(ii); sec. 1.170A-13(f)(2)(ii), Income Tax Regs.

The canceled checks consist of a $1,000 payment to Mr. Degado that was drawn on petitioner's personal account on September 16, 2005, and a $3,000 payment to Mr. Degado that contained the notation "Iron Gates". 8 The canceled checks, however, are not written acknowledgments from the organization. See sec. 170(f)(8).

Taken together, the canceled checks, the letter, the log, and the photographs corroborate petitioner's claim that she expended some money to purchase the fence on Bethel's behalf. Although petitioner has not complied with the substantiation requirements of section 170(f)(8) and the regulations thereunder, the Court is satisfied that petitioner made some payments on behalf of Bethel --but not $10,100. Putting aside the evidentiary issues, the receipt indicates that petitioner made three payments of $3,000, a $1,000 payment, and a $100 payment. The record establishes that petitioner has not provided any other evidence establishing payments over $1,000 9 to Mr. Degado in 2005. Thus, petitioner has not proven that she paid the remaining $9,100 in 2005. 10 Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioner is entitled to a $1,000 charitable contribution deduction for the fence for 2005. See Cohan v. Commissioner, supra at 544 (estimates of a taxpayer's deductions bear heavily against the taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his or her own making); see also Bond v. Commissioner, supra at 41.

Petitioner cannot deduct the "Van Payments" as charitable contributions since she continues to own the property. The "contributions", therefore, consist of less than petitioner's entire interest in the property and are not deductible. 11 See sec. 170(f)(3); sec. 1.170A-7(a)(1), Income Tax Regs.; cf. Logan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-445 (classifying the donee's "rent-free" use of the taxpayer's real property as a mere right to use property and disallowing a deduction for its fair rental value as a charitable contribution under section 170(f)(3)). Respondent's determination is sustained.

Petitioner cannot deduct the insurance premium payments for the van as charitable contributions. Petitioner has not shown that Bethel was the sole beneficiary of the policy. See Orr v. United States, 343 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1965). In addition, neither petitioner's log nor the letter from the insurance agent dated June 2, 2008, satisfies the contemporaneous acknowledgment requirements of section 1.170A-13(f)(2) and (3), Income Tax Regs. Respondent's determination is sustained. 12



III. Mortgage Interest Deduction
Section 163(a) allows a deduction for interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness. The "indebtedness" for purposes of section 163 must, in general, be an obligation of the taxpayer and not an obligation of another. Golder v. Commissioner, 604 F.2d 34, 35 (9th Cir. 1979), affg. T.C. Memo. 1976-150; Smith v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 889, 897 (1985), affd. without published opinion 805 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

Petitioner was not directly liable on the mortgages for which she claimed a mortgage interest deduction. But petitioner argues that she is entitled to a deduction for mortgage interest that she paid in 2005 pursuant to section 1.163-1(b), Income Tax Regs., which provides in pertinent part: "Interest paid by the taxpayer on a mortgage upon real estate of which he is the legal or equitable owner, even though the taxpayer is not directly liable upon the bond or note secured by such mortgage, may be deducted as interest on his indebtedness."

Petitioner claims that she has both a vested and an equitable interest in her mother's property at "319 E Newfield St". Petitioner testified that she started making the mortgage payments in February when her mother became ill and was no longer able to work.

State law determines the nature of property rights, while Federal law determines the appropriate Federal income tax treatment of those rights. See United States v. Natl. Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 722 (1985); Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 513 (1960). Thus, whatever rights or interests petitioner held in the property is determined pursuant to California law.

As is relevant here, title to the property of a decedent's estate vests, subject to administration, in his or her heirs immediately upon death under California law. Cal. Prob. Code sec. 7000; Olson v. Toy, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 29, 33 (Ct. App. 1996); Bethel v. Kerksey (In re Estate of Williams), 140 Cal. Rptr. 593, 597 (Ct. App. 1977) ("when there is an intestate succession, there is an automatic vesting of title in the intestate heirs subject to administration"); see also Cal. Prob. Code secs. 6400, 6401, and 6402. Such vesting is not contingent on any assent, acceptance, or election by the heirs. Taylor v. Crippled Children's Socy. (In re Estate of Taylor), 108 Cal. Rptr. 778, 781 (Ct. App. 1973) (citing Martin v. McGrath (In re Meyer's Estate), 238 P.2d 597, 605 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951)).

The Court considers several factors when determining whether a taxpayer is an equitable or beneficial owner of the property (and thus entitled to mortgage interest deductions). See Blanche v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-63, affd. 33 Fed. Appx. 704 (5th Cir. 2002). As is relevant here, the factors include: (1) Whether the taxpayer had a right to possess the property and to enjoy the use, rents, or profits thereof; (2) whether the taxpayer had a duty to maintain the property; (3) whether the taxpayer was responsible for insuring the property; (4) whether the taxpayer bore the risk of loss of the property; (5) whether the taxpayer was obligated to pay taxes, assessments, and charges against the property; and (6) whether the taxpayer had the right to improve the property without the owner's consent. Id.

Several of these factors weigh against petitioner for the period before her mother's death on August 15, 2005. Specifically, there is no indication that petitioner bore the risk of loss or that she was responsible for maintaining the property, insuring the property, or paying any taxes, assessments, or charges; and there is no indication that she had the right to make improvements. Thus, the Court finds that petitioner was not an equitable or beneficial owner of the property before her mother's death on August 15, 2005. Petitioner is not entitled to mortgage interest deductions for payments she made before August 15, 2005, because she was not directly liable on the notes securing the mortgages and she has failed to prove that she was the legal, equitable, or beneficial owner of the property before August 15, 2005. 13

The property's legal title, however, passed, in part, to petitioner on August 15, 2005. Petitioner is entitled to mortgage interest deductions for payments she made from August 15, 2005, subject to the substantiation requirement of section 6001. See Zards v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-497 (only mortgage interest paid for the period after the taxpayer becomes the legal or equitable owner of the property is deductible by the taxpayer).

Petitioner provided copies of Forms 1098, Mortgage Interest Statement, to substantiate her mortgage interest deductions. The Forms 1098 show interest payments in 2005 of: (1) $7,857.64 to Countrywide Home Loans (Countrywide); (2) $2,128.85 to POPA Federal Credit Union (POPA); and (3) $825.49 to "Vodofsky". In addition, petitioner provided two canceled checks issued in September 2005: One to Countrywide for $907.89 and one to POPA for $245.50. Petitioner also entered into evidence bank statements from September to December 2005. For September petitioner handwrote on the statement "HP" next to drafts in the sum of $1,040.47. For October petitioner handwrote on the statement "2nd" with respect to a "Transfer to Coleman Lula M * * * Loan 19" for $245.40. For November petitioner handwrote on the statement "2nd" with respect to a "Transfer to COLEMAN LULA M * * * Loan 19" for $245.40 and "HP" for a withdrawal to "MRS ASSOCIATES" for $841.75. For December petitioner handwrote on the statement "2nd" with respect to a "Transfer to COLEMAN LULA M * * * Loan 19" for $245.40 and "HP" with respect to withdrawals to Countrywide in the sum of $1,827.78 and "MORTGAGE JIT PMT" for $1,728.43.

It is unclear from the record that the September drafts and the payment to "MRS ASSOCIATES" were in fact mortgage payments. In addition, it is unclear from the record whether the "Mortgage JIT PMT" relates to the three mortgages for which interest deductions were claimed rather than to petitioner's home at the "E. 90th" address (for which no Form 1098 was entered into evidence). Petitioner testified that she makes four mortgage payments: One to Countrywide, one to Washington Mutual, one to "Vodofsky", and one to POPA. According to petitioner, the "[Mortgage JIT PMT] could be to any one of the other three."

From the evidence, the Court finds that petitioner is not entitled to mortgage interest deductions for the "Vodofsky" mortgage because she has not established that she made interest payments from August 15 to December 2005. See secs. 163(a), (h), 461. With respect to the Countrywide mortgage, petitioner has established that she made interest payments in September and December 2005, but she failed to establish that she made interest payments in August, October, and November 2005. Consequently, the Court finds that petitioner is entitled to deductions for mortgage interest paid to Countrywide in September and December 2005. See secs. 163(a), (h), 461. With respect to the POPA mortgage, petitioner has established that she made interest payments from September to December 2005. Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioner is entitled to deductions for mortgage interest paid to POPA from September to December 2005.



IV. Theft Loss Deduction
In general, section 165(a) and (c)(3) allows an individual a deduction for any theft sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise. Among other requirements, petitioner must establish that she personally sustained the theft loss. See Draper v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 135, 135-136 (1950) (only the owner of the misappropriated property is entitled to a theft loss deduction because the loss is personal to the owner); Malik v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-204 (taxpayer could not claim a theft loss deduction because he was not the victim of the theft).

The police officer's incident report states that the location of the theft was Bethel. The officer's narrative explains that "unknown person(s) broke into * * * the interior of [Bethel]" and stole 2 computers, including monitors and printers, worth $2,000 that were located in an office in the "northwest corner of [Bethel]."

On her Form 4684, Casualties and Thefts Loss, petitioner described the theft event as a "HOME BURGLARY" and described the misappropriated property as "VARIOUS HOUSEHOLD ITEMS" worth $10,148.

Petitioner testified that the items were taken from Bethel, not from her residence. Petitioner explained that she uses "many different things down at [Bethel], but they [are] my personal items". Petitioner also testified that she did not have anything to prove that she owned the items. According to petitioner, she had to take the loss because Bethel did not have insurance.

Petitioner has failed to prove that she owned the misappropriated property. See also Urban Redev. Corp. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 328, 332 (4th Cir. 1961) (the Court may reject a taxpayer's uncorroborated, self-serving testimony), affg. 34 T.C. 845 (1960); Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986) (same). Because petitioner has failed to establish that she personally sustained a theft loss, respondent's disallowance of the theft loss is sustained. See Draper v. Commissioner, supra at 135-136; Malik v. Commissioner, supra; see also INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) (stating that deductions are strictly a matter of legislative grace, and taxpayers bear the burden of proving that they are entitled to claim the deduction).



V. Accuracy-Related Penalty
Initially, the Commissioner has the burden of production with respect to any penalty, addition to tax, or additional amount. Sec. 7491(c). The Commissioner satisfies this burden of production by coming forward with sufficient evidence that indicates that it is appropriate to impose the penalty. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001). Once the Commissioner satisfies this burden of production, the taxpayer must persuade the Court that the Commissioner's determination is in error by supplying sufficient evidence of reasonable cause, substantial authority, or a similar provision. Id.

In pertinent part, section 6662(a) and (b)(1) and (2) imposes an accuracy-related penalty equal to 20 percent of the underpayment that is attributable to negligence or disregard of rules or regulations or a substantial understatement of income tax. 14 Section 6662(c) defines the term "negligence" to include "any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of this title," and the term "disregard" to include "any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard." Negligence also includes any failure by the taxpayer to keep adequate books and records or to substantiate items properly. Sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.

Section 6664(c)(1) provides an exception to the section 6662(a) penalty: no penalty is imposed with respect to any portion of an underpayment if it is shown that there was reasonable cause therefor and the taxpayer acted in good faith. Section 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs., incorporates a facts and circumstances test to determine whether the taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith. The most important factor is the extent of the taxpayer's effort to assess his proper tax liability. Id. "Circumstances that may indicate reasonable cause and good faith include an honest misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in light of * * * the experience, knowledge and education of the taxpayer." Id.

The Court finds that respondent has met his burden of production and that petitioner was negligent. Petitioner did not properly substantiate her deductions as required by the Code and the regulations. Petitioner did not establish a defense for her noncompliance with the Code's requirements. Respondent's determinations are sustained.

Other arguments made by the parties and not discussed herein were considered and rejected as irrelevant, without merit, and/or moot.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decisions will be entered under Rule 155.

1 Petitioner's $19,441 charitable contribution deduction included a $562 carryover from 2003. Petitioner neither argued nor established that she had a $562 carryover from 2003. Petitioner is deemed to have conceded the issue. See Money v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 46, 48 (1987); see also Stutsman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1961-109 (and cases cited therein).

2 The $1,239.26 figure consists of amounts evidenced by: (1) Copies of checks numbered 8652, 8653, 8662, 8674, and 8720 payable to Bethel Pentecostal Church (Bethel) that total $395.25; (2) copies of checks numbered 8713 and 8823 payable to "Bishop Martin" and "Sister Cascada" that total $125; and (3) copies of checks numbered 8686, 8712, 8851, 8794, 8790, 8776, and 8793 payable to various persons who performed services for the church that total $719.01.

3 The $3,014 figure consists of amounts evidenced by: (1) Copies of checks numbered 8950, 9016, 9043, 9044, 9046, 9068, 9084, 9144, 9168, and 9177 payable to Bethel that total $280; (2) copies of checks numbered 8981, 8990, 9145, 9146, 9149, 9150, and 9167 payable to various charities that total $1,200; (3) copies of checks numbered 8996 and 9119 payable to various persons who provided services for Bethel that total $200; (4) copies of checks numbered 9032 and 3215 payable to "Bishop T. Martin" and "Thomas Martin" that total $834; and (5) $500 that was allowed by respondent's revenue agent during the examination of petitioner's return.

4 The log and the letters fail to differentiate between contributions that were below $250 and those of $250 or more in the $18,293.71 sum that petitioner alleges that she paid at various intervals during 2004. The Court notes that such cash contributions would not be deductible even under the less stringent standard of sec. 1.170A-13(a)(1), Income Tax Regs., because the letters do not show the dates of the "various" contributions or the amounts thereof.

5 Petitioner testified that the title "Elder L.C. Kincy" is the name that she uses in her pastorage.

6 Specifically, the defects include: (1) Petitioner's log is not a written acknowledgment from the organization; (2) petitioner's log, the Bishop Coward letter, and the Secretary Jackson letter were not contemporaneous; and (3) the Pastor Kincy letter acknowledging petitioner's own charitable contributions is suspect in that it purports to be written by an individual other than petitioner. Thus, the Court accords little weight to the Pastor Kincy letter.

7 Petitioner did not call the worker as a witness to corroborate her charitable contribution.

8 The $3,000 check was signed by petitioner on Sept. 9, 2005, and was drawn on an account titled in her mother's name.

Cal. Prob. Code sec. 7000 (West 1991) provides that title to a decedent's property passes on the decedent's death to the decedent's heirs as prescribed by the laws governing intestate succession. As of Aug. 15, 2005, title to the account passed to petitioner's father and certain heirs (including petitioner). See Cal. Prob. Code secs. 6400, 6401, and 6402 (West Supp. 2008), 7000; see also United States v. Natl. Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 722 (1985) (State law determines the nature of property rights).

Federal law determines the appropriate Federal income tax treatment of petitioner's $3,000 purported contribution. United States v. Natl. Bank of Commerce, supra at 722. An estate is a separate taxable entity. See sec. 641; Herter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1961-19. Generally, estates are allowed deductions for charitable contributions if the contributions are paid out of the estate's gross income and are made "pursuant to the terms of the governing instrument". Sec. 642(c)(1). Because petitioner is not the taxpayer who made the contribution, she is not entitled to claim a deduction for the contribution. See Mellott v. United States, 257 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1958); United States v. Norton, 250 F.2d 902, 905 (5th Cir. 1958); see also Stussy v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-293.

9 See supra note 8.

10 Petitioner entered into evidence a bank statement for the period Jan. 1 to 31, 2006, showing a $3,000 payment by "Draft 009207" that bears petitioner's handwritten notation "Iron Gates". Putting aside the hearsay matter, the Court notes that the payment was "Effective" on Jan. 12, 2006, and posted on Jan. 13, 2006. Thus, it appears that petitioner would be entitled to this $3,000 deduction, if at all, in 2006, not 2005. See secs. 446(a), 461(a).

11 In addition, petitioner has not proven that the limited exceptions of sec. 170(f)(3) apply. See also sec. 1.170A-7(a) and (b), Income Tax Regs.

12 There is no evidence in the record as to the number of miles petitioner drove in her charitable endeavors that would allow a charitable contribution deduction based either on petitioner's out-of-pocket expenses or on the standard mileage deduction. See sec. 170(i); sec. 1.170A-1(g), Income Tax Regs.

13 If a taxpayer pays mortgage interest accrued before the date he became the legal or equitable owner of the mortgaged property, the amount must be capitalized as part of his cost of the property. See Koehler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1978-381 (and cases cited therein).

14 Because the Court finds that petitioner was negligent or disregarded rules or regulations, the Court need not discuss whether there is a substantial understatement of income tax. See sec. 6662(b); Fields v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-207.

Labels:

Thursday, January 29, 2009

Correction to 6694 Final Regulations

Some of the changes involve important issues. I have the full text of the corrections to the 6694 final regulations uploaded below in this blog. But, to add some interest to this blog, I will discuss one of the corrections, as follows:

§1.6694-1(b)(2) <>If there is a signing tax return preparer within the meaning of §301.7701-15(b)(1) of this chapter within a firm, the signing tax return preparer generally will be considered the person who is primarily responsible for all of the positions on the return or claim for refund giving rise to an understatement unless, based upon credible information from any source, it is concluded that the signing tax return preparer is not primarily responsible for the position(s) on the return or claim for refund giving rise to an understatement.

There has to be a lot of tension between the signing tax return preparer and other people within the firm who input on each position. In most cases, there will be or should be a return reviewer. If I were the signing return preparer, I would not want the 6694 penalty risk and if I were the reviewer, I would want the risk. The penalties are huge and they will come.

I have been working on a simple theft loss issue for the 2008 tax year from a victim of the Madoff embezzlement. It is not a simple issue. The regulations are complex and narrowly drafted and there is a lot of judicial authority that deals with the issue. I will draft an opinion on whether the investor can tax a section 165(e) theft loss in the 2008 tax year. But assuming that I am a reviewer or a signing tax return preparer in your firm, which one, under the facts, is the prepson who is "primarily responsible" for the position in the return. I feel your pain - that is not an easy determination and is likely to be an issue that should be resolved within the firm. It is my personal opinion that the person making the final decision in the firm should ordinarly be the person "primarily responsible" except in cases where one member of the firm prepares the technical position relied upon by the reviewer. This is an interesting topic and comment is invited. If you rely on a tax attorney or some other outside tax expert, then the person writing the position becomes the return preparer, and at the same time, that reduces the risk of the 6662 penalty on the client if the position is wro


T.D. 9436, Correction

January 29, 2009

Code Sec. 6060

Code Sec. 6107

Code Sec. 6109

Code Sec. 6694

Code Sec. 6695

Code Sec. 6696

Code Sec. 7701

Tax return preparers : Definitions : Penalties : Standards : Calculation : Disclosure requirements : T.D. 9436, correction .



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Internal Revenue Service

26 CFR Parts 1, 20, 25, 26, 31, 40, 41, 44, 53, 54, 55, 56, 156, 157, and 301

[ TD 9436 ]

RIN 1545-BG83

Tax Return Preparer Penalties Under Sections 6694 and 6695; Correction

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

ACTION: Correcting amendment.

SUMMARY: This document contains corrections to final regulations ( TD 9436 ) that were published in the Federal Register on Monday, December 22, 2008 (73 FR 78430) implementing amendments to the tax return preparer penalties under sections 6694 and 6695 of the Internal Revenue Code and related provisions under sections 6060 , 6107, 6109, 6696, and 7701(a)(36) reflecting amendments to the Code made by section 8246 of the Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007 and section 506 of the Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008. The final regulations affect tax return preparers and provide guidance regarding the amended provisions.

DATES: This correction is effective January 29, 2009, and is applicable on December 22, 2008.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael E. Hara, (202) 622-4910, and Matthew S. Cooper, (202) 622-4940 (not toll-free numbers).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:



Background

The final regulations that are the subject of this document are under sections 6060 , 6107, 6109, 6694, 6695, 6696, and 7701 of the Internal Revenue Code.



Need for Correction

As published, final regulations ( TD 9436 ) contains errors that may prove to be misleading and are in need of clarification.



List of Subjects



26 CFR Part 1

Income taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 20

Generation-skipping transfer taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 25

Gift taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 26

Generation-skipping transfer taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 31

Employment taxes, Income taxes, Penalties, Pensions, Railroad retirement, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Social security, Unemployment compensation.



26 CFR Part 40

Excise taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 41

Excise taxes, Motor vehicles, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 44

Excise taxes, Gambling, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 53

Excise taxes, Foundations, Investments, Lobbying, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 54

Excise taxes, Pensions, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 55

Excise taxes, Investments, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 56

Excise taxes, Lobbying, Nonprofit organizations, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 156

Excise taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 157

Excise taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



26 CFR Part 301

Employment taxes, Estate taxes, Excise taxes, Gift taxes, Income taxes, Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.



Correction of Publication

Accordingly, 26 CFR parts 1, 20, 25, 26, 31, 40, 41, 44, 53, 54, 55, 56, 156, 157, and 301 are corrected by making the following correcting amendments:



PART 1 --INCOME TAXES

Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 1 continues to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Par. 2. Section 1.6107-1 is amended by revising paragraphs (d) (1) and (2) to read as follows:



§1.6107-1 Tax return preparer must furnish copy of return or claim for refund to taxpayer and must retain a copy or record.

* * * * *

(d) * * *

(1) For the civil penalty for failure to furnish a copy of the return or claim for refund to the taxpayers (or nontaxable entity) as required under paragraph (a) of this section, see section 6695(a) and §1.6695-1(a) .

(2) For the civil penalty for failure to retain a copy of the return or claim for refund, or to retain a record as required under paragraph (b) of this section, see section 6695(d) and §1.6695-1(d) .

* * * * *

Par. 3. Section 1.6694-1 is amended as follows:

1. The first sentence of paragraph (b)(2) is revised.

2. The second sentence of paragraph (f)(4) Example 1 . is revised.

3. The eighth sentence of paragraph (f)(4) Example 2 . is revised.



§1.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparers.

* * * * *

(b) * * *

(2) * * * If there is a signing tax return preparer within the meaning of §301.7701-15(b)(1) of this chapter within a firm, the signing tax return preparer generally will be considered the person who is primarily responsible for all of the positions on the return or claim for refund giving rise to an understatement unless, based upon credible information from any source, it is concluded that the signing tax return preparer is not primarily responsible for the position(s) on the return or claim for refund giving rise to an understatement. * * *

* * * * *

(f) * * *

(4) * * *

Example 1 . * * * Of this amount, $20,000 relates to research and consultation regarding a transaction that is later reported on a return, and $1,000 is for the activities relating to the preparation of the return. * * *

Example 2 . * * * Because K's signature as the signing tax return preparer is on the return, the IRS advises K that K may be subject to the section 6694(a) penalty. * * *

* * * * *

Par. 4. Section 1.6694-2 is amended by revising the last sentence of each paragraph (d)(1), (d)(2), and (d)(3)(ii) to read as follows:



§1.6694-2 Penalty for understatement due to an unreasonable position.

* * * * *

(d) * * *

(1) * * * For an exception to the section 6694(a) penalty for reasonable cause and good faith, see paragraph (e) of this section.

(2) * * * For purposes of determining whether the tax return preparer has a reasonable basis for a position, a tax return preparer may rely in good faith without verification upon information furnished by the taxpayer and information and advice furnished by another advisor, another tax return preparer, or other party (including another advisor or tax return preparer at the tax return preparer's firm), as provided in §§1.6694-1(e) and 1.6694-2(e)(5).

(3) * * *

(ii) * * * In addition, disclosure of a position is adequate in the case of a nonsigning tax return preparer if, with respect to that position, the tax return preparer complies with the provisions of paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(A) or (B) of this section, whichever is applicable.

* * * * *

Par. 5. Section 1.6694-3 is amended by revising the first two sentences of paragraph (c)(2) to read as follows:



§1.6694-3 Penalty for understatement due to willful, reckless, or intentional conduct.

* * * * *

(c) * * *

(2) A tax return preparer is not considered to have recklessly or intentionally disregarded a rule or regulation if the position contrary to the rule or regulation has a reasonable basis as defined in §1.6694-2(d)(2) and is adequately disclosed in accordance with §§1.6694-2(d)(3)(i)(A) or (C) or 1.6694-2(d)(3)(ii). In the case of a position contrary to a regulation, the position must represent a good faith challenge to the validity of the regulation and, when disclosed in accordance with §§1.6694-2(d)(3)(i)(A) or (C) or 1.6694-2(d)(3)(ii), the tax return preparer must identify the regulation being challenged. * * *

* * * * *

Par. 6. Section 1.6695-1 is amended by revising paragraph (a)(2)(ii) to read as follows:



§1.6695-1 Other assessable penalties with respect to the preparation of tax returns for other persons.

(a) * * *

(2) * * *

(ii) In order faithfully to carry out their official duties, have so arranged their affairs that they have less than full knowledge of the property that they hold or of the debts for which they are responsible, if information is deleted from the copy in order to preserve or maintain this arrangement.

* * * * *

Par. 7. Section 1.6696-1 is amended by revising the introductory text of paragraph (g)(1)(i) to read as follows:



§1.6696-1 Claims for credit or refund by tax return preparers or appraisers.

* * * * *

(g) Time for filing claim . (1)(i) Except as provided in section 6694(c)(1) and §1.6694-4(a)(4)(ii) and (5), and in section 6694(d) and §1.6694-1(d) :

* * * * *



PART 20 --ESTATE TAX; ESTATES OF DECEDENTS DYING AFTER AUGUST 16, 1954

Par. 8. The authority citation for part 20 is amended by revising an entry for Section 20.6109-1 and removing an entry for Section 20.6695-2 in numerical order to read as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Section 20.6109-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *

Par. 9. Section 20.6694-1 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§20.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparer.

(a) In general . For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of estate tax returns or claims for refund, see §1.6694-1 of this chapter.

* * * * *



PART 25 --GIFT TAX; GIFTS MADE AFTER DECEMBER 31, 1954

Par. 10. The authority citation for part 25 is amended by revising an entry for Section 25.6109-1 and removing an entry for Section 25.6695-2 in numerical order to read as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Section 25.6109-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *

Par. 11. Section 25.6694-1 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§25.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparer.

(a) In general . For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of gift tax returns or claims for refund, see §1.6694-1 of this chapter.

* * * * *



PART 26 --GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX REGULATIONS UNDER THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986

Par. 12. The authority citation for part 26 is amended by revising an entry for Section 26.6109-1 and removing an entry for Section 26.6695-2 in numerical order to read as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Section 26.6109-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *

Par. 13. Section 26.6694-1 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§26.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparer.

(a) In general . For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of generation-skipping transfer tax returns or claims for refund, see §1.6694-1 of this chapter.

* * * * *



PART 31 --EMPLOYMENT TAXES AND COLLECTION OF INCOME TAX AT THE SOURCE

Par. 14. The authority citation for part 31 is amended by removing an entry for Section 31.6695-2 in numerical order to read as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Par. 15. Section 31.6694-1 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§31.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparer.

(a) In general . For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of employment tax returns or claims for refund of employment tax under chapters 21 through 25 of subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code, see §1.6694-1 of this chapter.

* * * * *

Par. 16. Section 31.6694-3 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§31.6694-3 Penalty for understatement due to willful, reckless, or intentional conduct .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of employment tax under chapters 21 through 25 of subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(b) of the Code in the manner stated in §1.6694-3 of this chapter.

* * * * *



PART 40 --EXCISE TAX PROCEDURAL REGULATIONS

Par. 17. The authority citation for part 40 is amended by revising an entry for Section 40.6109-1 and removing an entry for Section 40.6695-2 in numerical order to read as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Section 40.6109-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *

Par. 18. Section 40.6060-1 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§40.6060-1 Reporting requirements for tax return preparers.

(a) In general . A person that employs one or more tax return preparers to prepare a return or claim for refund of any tax to which this part 40 applies other than for the person, at any time during a return period, shall satisfy the recordkeeping and inspection requirements in the manner stated in §1.6060-1 of this chapter.

* * * * *

Par. 19. Section 40.6107-1 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§40.6107-1 Tax return preparer must furnish copy of return to taxpayer and must retain a copy or record .

(a) In general . A person who is a signing tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of any tax to which this part 40 applies shall furnish a completed copy of the return or claim for refund to the taxpayer and retain a completed copy or record in the manner stated in §1.6107-1 of this chapter.

* * * * *

Par. 20. Section 40.6109-1 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§40.6109-1 Tax return preparers furnishing identifying numbers for returns or claims for refund .

(a) In general . Each return or claim for refund of any tax to which this part 40 applies prepared by one or more signing tax return preparers must include the identifying number of the preparer required by §1.6695-1(b) of this chapter to sign the return or claim for refund in the manner stated in §1.6109-2 of this chapter.

* * * * *

Par. 21. Section 40.6694-1 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§40.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparer.

(a) In general . For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of returns or claims for refund of any tax to which this part 40 applies, see §1.6694-1 of this chapter.

* * * * *

Par. 22. Section 40.6694-2 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§40.6694-2 Penalties for understatement due to an unreasonable position .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of any tax to which this part 40 applies shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(a) in the manner stated in §1.6694-2 of this chapter.

* * * * *

Par. 23. Section 40.6694-3 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§40.6694-3 Penalties for understatement due to willful, reckless, or intentional conduct .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of any tax to which this part 40 applies shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(b) in the manner stated in §1.6694-3 of this chapter.

* * * * *

Par. 24. Section 40.6694-4 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§40.6694-4 Extension of period of collection when tax return preparer pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability and certain other procedural matters .

(a) In general . For rules relating to the extension of period of collection when a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund of any tax to which this part 40 applies pays 15 percent of a penalty for understatement of taxpayer's liability and procedural matters relating to the investigation, assessment and collection of the penalties under section 6694(a) and (b), the rules under §1.6694-4 of this chapter will apply.

* * * * *

Par. 25. Section 40.6695-1 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§40.6695-1 Other assessable penalties with respect to the preparation of tax returns for other persons .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of any tax to which this part 40 applies shall be subject to penalties for failure to furnish a copy to the taxpayer under section 6695(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code), failure to sign the return under section 6695(b) of the Code, failure to furnish an identification number under section 6695(c) of the Code, failure to retain a copy or list under section 6695(d) of the Code, failure to file a correct information return under section 6695(e) of the Code, and negotiation of a check under section 6695(f) of the Code, in the manner stated in §6695 -1 of this chapter.

* * * * *

Par. 26. Section 40.6696-1 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§40.6696-1 Claims for credit or refund by tax return preparers .

(a) In general . The rules under §1.6696-1 of this chapter will apply for claims for credit or refund by a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund of any tax to which this part 40 applies.

* * * * *



PART 41 --EXCISE TAX ON USE OF CERTAIN HIGHWAY MOTOR VEHICLES

Par. 27. The authority citation for part 41 is amended by removing an entry for Section 41.6695-2 in numerical order to read as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Par. 28. Section 41.6695-1 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§41.6695-1 Other assessable penalties with respect to the preparation of tax returns for other persons .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of excise tax under section 4481 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties for failure to furnish a copy to the taxpayer under section 6695(a) of the Code, failure to sign a return under section 6695(b) of the Code, failure to furnish an identification number under section 6695(c) of the Code, failure to retain a copy or list under section 6695(d) of the Code, failure to file a correct information return under section 6695(e) of the Code, and negotiation of a check under section 6695(f) of the Code, in the manner stated in §6695 -1 of this chapter.

* * * * *



PART 44 --TAXES ON WAGERING; EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 1955

Par. 29. The authority citation for part 44 is amended by revising an entry for Section 44.6109-1 and removing an entry for Section 44.6695-2 in numerical order to read as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Section 44.6109-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *

Par. 30. Section 44.6695-1 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§44.6695-1 Other assessable penalties with respect to the preparation of tax returns for other persons .

(a) In general . A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax on wagers under sections 4401 or 4411 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties for failure to furnish a copy to the taxpayer under section 6695(a) of the Code, failure to sign the return under section 6695(b) of the Code, failure to furnish an identification number under section 6695(c) of the Code, failure to retain a copy or list under section 6695(d) of the Code, failure to file a correct information return under section 6695(e) of the Code, and negotiation of a check under section 6695(f) of the Code, in the manner stated in §6695 -1 of this chapter.

* * * * *



PART 53 --FOUNDATION AND SIMILAR EXCISE TAXES

Par. 31. The authority citation for part 53 is amended by revising an entry for Section 53.6109-1 and removing an entry for Section 53.6695-2 in numerical order to read as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Section 53.6109-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *



PART 54 --PENSION EXCISE TAXES

Par. 32. The authority citation for part 54 is amended by revising an entry for Section 54.6109-1 and removing an entry for Section 54.6695-2 in numerical order to read as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Section 54.6109-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *

Par. 33. In FR Doc. E8-29750 appearing on page 78430 in the Federal Register of Monday, December 22, 2008, the following correction is made:



Section 54.6694-3 [Corrected]

On page 78458, in the third column, in paragraph 107, the instruction "Section 56.6694-3 is added to read as follows:" is removed and the language "Section 54.6694-3 is added to read as follows:" is added in its place.



PART 55 --EXCISE TAX ON REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND REGULATED INVESTMENT COMPANIES

Par. 34. The authority citation for part 55 is amended by revising an entry for Section 55.6109-1 and removing an entry for Section 55.6695-2 in numerical order to read as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Section 55.6109-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *



PART 56 --PUBLIC CHARITY EXCISE TAXES

Par. 35. The authority citation for part 56 is amended by revising an entry for Section 56.6109-1 and removing an entry for Section 56.6695-2 in numerical order to read as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Section 56.6109-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *



PART 156 --EXCISE TAX ON GREENMAIL

Par. 36. The authority citation for part 156 is amended by revising an entry for Section 156.6109-1 and removing an entry for Section 156.6695-2 in numerical order to read as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Section 156.6109-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *



PART 157 --EXCISE TAX ON STRUCTURED SETTLEMENT FACTORING TRANSACTIONS

Par. 37. The authority citation for part 157 is amended by revising an entry for Section 157.6109-1 and removing an entry for Section 157.6695-2 in numerical order to read as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Section 157.6109-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *



PART 301 --PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION

Par. 38. The authority citation for part 301 continues to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Par. 39. Section 301.7701-15 is amended by revising paragraph (f)(1)(xi)(B) to read as follows:



§301.7701-15 Tax return preparer .

* * * * *

(f) * * *

(1) * * *

(xi) * * *

(B) A waiver of restriction on assessment after initiation of an audit of the taxpayer or another taxpayer if a determination in the audit of the other taxpayer affects, directly or indirectly, the liability of the taxpayer for tax.

* * * * *


LaNita Van Dyke



Chief, Publications and Regulations Branch



Legal Processing Division



Associate Chief Counsel



(Procedure and Administration)

Labels:

Wednesday, January 28, 2009

Interesting case - a "must read"

I have put up the this case previously, but have uploaded the Cruz case again for a number of reasons, although it is a very strnge case with a very strange analysis and result. You should read it carefully.

First, think about the $5,000 6694(b) penalties that could be assessed agains the return preparer and the firm.

Second, it references the duty of the return preparer to know the tax statutes and regulations. Believe it!

Third, it is apparent that the Court appears to treat negligence as intentional. But if the Court can do that in this case, then there is a very possible that in another case the Court could find return preparer fraud. Where there are multiple errors, as in the present case, it is logical for the Court or the IRS to consider whether the errors are intentional.

Fourth, the Court gives guidance on procedures that should be followed in every tax preparation firm. The issue of appropriate practices of a return preparer firm is going to be a huge issue going forward in dealing with the "firm" reasonabl practices due to the fact that the firm is subject to the 6694 penalties. The following is a quote from the case:

Defendants' Practices


24. Prior to 2005, NBC's tax preparation services worked as follows: Clients were seen by appointment and first met with a staff member would interview the client and input the data into tax preparation software on a computer to generate a tax return. The initial interviewers were given no formal tax training or education. Cruz would review the tax return with the client, input any additional data needed, and sign the return as the preparer. Cruz's review was not a line-by-line audit of the draft tax return. Nevertheless Cruz maintained the ability to change any of the information previously entered by the interviewer.

25. NBC did not maintain any sort of general quality control procedure after tax returns were prepared and did not maintain receipts or other substantiation for the returns it prepared for its clients. No written record was made of the information provided by the taxpayer.

26. It was common for at least some of the information provided by the client to the interviewer to be provided orally, that is, without documentary support.

27. In the discretion of the interviewer or Cruz, the orally provided information would either be accepted or supporting documentation was requested.

28. In some instances NBC refused to prepare a return or enter an item thereon absent substantiation by supporting documents.

29. As of September of 2004, NBC did not have any procedures for documenting client verification of the information on the tax returns that might have occurred. That is, the client would not sign any acknowledgment that the return was accurate or that the client has indeed provided the information that ultimately appeared on the return. Nor did NBC have any procedure for documenting any inquiry made by the interviewer or Cruz with respect to supporting documentation or predicate facts necessary to support any particular deduction.

30. During the years at issue, tax years 2003-2006, there was no requirement for the tax return preparer to audit clients' tax returns or maintain the clients' supporting documentation.



The #30 item has some relevance to the requirement in the final regulations that there is a reference to items that the return preparer should be aware of situations of facts that require further inquiry or investigation.


United States of America, Plaintiff v. Abelardo Ernest Cruz, Nations Business Center, Inc., Nations Tax Service, Inc., Ruth Real, and Ruth Real and Associates, Inc., Defendants. U.S. District Court, So. Dist. Fla.; 07-61003-CIV-ZLOCH, December 30, 2008.







ORDER


ZLOCH, District Judge: THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Plaintiff's Complaint (DE 1) filed herein. A nine day non-jury trial was held commencing Wednesday, September 3, 2008. The Court has carefully reviewed the entire court file herein and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.




I. Background


Defendants are tax return preparers in the Miami area. In the early 1990s, during the course of the Internal Revenue Service's normal audit practice, Defendants, especially Abelardo Ernest Cruz (hereinafter "Cruz"), came under suspicion for several questionable practices. In 1995 and again in 1998, certain returns prepared by Cruz were selected for audit, and certain items were disallowed. Preparer penalties were imposed on Cruz for the positions taken on the returns. A formal investigation into returns prepared by Defendants was initiated in 2003 and was ongoing as of the date of trial. This investigation uncovered voluminous problems on returns prepared by Defendants, including improper deductions and exclusions and improper treatment of income. Ultimately the IRS referred the matter to the United States Department of Justice, who initiated this action.

The subject of the investigation and trial in this action were returns prepared by Defendants for tax years 2003 through 2006. In total 149 returns were audited, the great majority of which had deductions and exclusions from income disallowed. The Government initiated this action seeking injunctive relief against Defendants, proceeding under three sections of the Internal Revenue Code: 26 U.S.C. §§7407, 7408, & 7402 (2006). The Government seeks a permanent injunction barring Defendants from preparing tax returns or assisting in their preparation. The relevant statutes empower the Court to grant a range of relief from enjoining prohibited conduct to barring all tax preparation services, to entering any order necessary to aid in the proper administration of the internal revenue laws.

As more fully explained below, the Court finds that Defendants have engaged in conduct that impeded the proper enforcement and administration of the internal revenue laws. Specifically, they have knowingly taken unreasonable positions on tax returns, have knowingly aided in the preparation of returns with material misstatements on them resulting in an understatement of tax liability, and have misrepresented their ability to practice before the IRS. Thus, injunctive relief is proper. However, Defendants have demonstrated that they have worked diligently to eradicate past unlawful behavior and implemented procedures designed to minimize or eliminate these types of mistakes in their tax preparation practice. A balance of the hardships and consideration of the public interest favors keeping Defendants in business while enjoining the offending conduct. It is also sufficient to prevent further unlawful conduct. These conclusions are based on the type and rate of errors uncovered by the Government's investigation, as well as Defendants' efforts to eliminate the same.

After full presentation of the evidence by both sides and observing the demeanor of the witnesses, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 the Court hereby makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:




II. Findings of Fact





A. Background


1. Defendant Abelardo Ernest Cruz (hereinafter "Cruz") works as a tax return preparer in the area of Miami, Florida. Cruz is the primary manager and operator of Defendant Nations Business Center, Inc. (hereinafter "NBC") and Defendant Nations Tax Service, Inc. (hereinafter "NTS"). While both entities are owned by Cruz's wife Annmarie Biondolillo, she does not have an active role in the businesses.

2. NBC was established by Cruz in the early 1990s and continues to operate to this day. NTS was established by Cruz in late 2004 or early 2005 and likewise continues to operate.

3. In 1993, Cruz entered a plea of nolo contendere to a felony charge in Florida state court. The circumstances giving rise to the plea arose in 1988. Cruz was incarcerated for six months in 1993 following the plea.

4. Upon his release from jail, Cruz began re-building his tax preparation business.

5. NBC was formed with the funds of Cruz's then-estranged wife.

6. The tax return preparation business of NBC grew steadily from 1995 through 1998.

7. NBC operated primarily as a tax preparation service through 2004. When NTS was formed, NBC began to phase out its tax preparation practice and NTS became Cruz's main tax preparation service entity. Since that time, NBC has been primarily engaged in the business of accounting and payroll processing for business clients.

8. Defendant Ruth Real (hereinafter "Real") is also a tax return preparer in the Miami area. She owns and operates Defendant Ruth Real & Associates, Inc., a tax preparation service serving about thirty (30) clients.

9. In addition, Real works as an employee of both NBC and NTS. She prepares tax returns for clients of all three businesses, and she purports to represent clients of NBC, NTS, and Ruth Real & Associates, Inc. in audits of their tax returns by the Internal Revenue Service.




B. Previous audits and penalties


10. In or about 1995, Internal Revenue Agent Alice Denny (hereinafter "Denny") audited several tax returns prepared by NBC for tax years 1993 and 1994 that claimed a credit for payment of fuel taxes. Denny disallowed the fuel tax credits and proposed a preparer penalty against Cruz for each return.

11. At the same time, Internal Revenue Agent Joanne Leavitt (hereinafter "Leavitt") audited several tax returns prepared by NBC that claimed a credit for fuel taxes. Leavitt also disallowed the credits and asserted preparer penalties against Cruz.

12. In total there were about fourteen penalties proposed against Cruz.

13. Cruz believed the fuel tax credits were properly taken, or at least were not unreasonable positions, and filed the necessary paperwork to take his proposed penalties to the IRS appeals office.

14. The IRS and Cruz settled the matter at appeals. Seven preparer penalties were conceded by Cruz and the remaining seven were dropped.

15. The settlement was reached based upon the parties' assessment of the hazards of litigation before the United States Tax Court.

16. In 1996 and 1998, the IRS again reviewed additional samples of returns prepared by NBC. It found that Cruz incorrectly placed Schedule C income on the front of Form 1040 and incorrectly placed income subject to self-employment tax on Schedule E. Both actions resulted in an understatement of tax liability.

17. On May 7, 1998, the IRS revoked Cruz's eligibility to represent taxpayers in audits or appeals. See Government Exhibit 46.

18. This censure was based on several instances of "disreputable conduct," including Cruz's plea of nolo contendere, see ¶ 3, a determination by a bankruptcy court that Cruz embezzled over $680,000, and the preparer penalties previously discussed.

19. Cruz was also barred from participating in the IRS's efiling program due to the criminal conviction following his nolo contendere plea.

20. During the five year period of time from 1998 through 2002, NBC prepared over 10,000 income tax returns. Cruz signed each return as the preparer.

21. Five preparer penalties were assessed against Cruz for mistakes contained in five of the 10,000 returns.

22. No further preparer penalties were assessed against Cruz.

23. No preparer penalty has ever been assessed against Ruth Real.




C. Defendants' Practices


24. Prior to 2005, NBC's tax preparation services worked as follows: Clients were seen by appointment and first met with a staff member would interview the client and input the data into tax preparation software on a computer to generate a tax return. The initial interviewers were given no formal tax training or education. Cruz would review the tax return with the client, input any additional data needed, and sign the return as the preparer. Cruz's review was not a line-by-line audit of the draft tax return. Nevertheless Cruz maintained the ability to change any of the information previously entered by the interviewer.

25. NBC did not maintain any sort of general quality control procedure after tax returns were prepared and did not maintain receipts or other substantiation for the returns it prepared for its clients. No written record was made of the information provided by the taxpayer.

26. It was common for at least some of the information provided by the client to the interviewer to be provided orally, that is, without documentary support.

27. In the discretion of the interviewer or Cruz, the orally provided information would either be accepted or supporting documentation was requested.

28. In some instances NBC refused to prepare a return or enter an item thereon absent substantiation by supporting documents.

29. As of September of 2004, NBC did not have any procedures for documenting client verification of the information on the tax returns that might have occurred. That is, the client would not sign any acknowledgment that the return was accurate or that the client has indeed provided the information that ultimately appeared on the return. Nor did NBC have any procedure for documenting any inquiry made by the interviewer or Cruz with respect to supporting documentation or predicate facts necessary to support any particular deduction.

30. During the years at issue, tax years 2003-2006, there was no requirement for the tax return preparer to audit clients' tax returns or maintain the clients' supporting documentation.




D. Facts Preceding the Investigation


31. Denny was promoted to Return Preparer Coordinator for South Florida. When promoted, there were ongoing audits of returns prepared by NBC, and they were referred to Denny. In 2003, Denny named Cruz and NBC in a referral letter sent to the IRS's Lead Development Center ("LDC"), a group that reviews recurring problems to determine whether further action against a preparer is warranted.

32. Denny's referral letter reflects that the request for authority to investigate Cruz and NBC was partly based upon the seven income tax returns prepared approximately ten years earlier in 1993 and 1994 claiming a fuel tax credit and resulting in seven sustained preparer penalties. Gov. Ex. 92.

33. The referral letter also noted that the percentage of returns Cruz prepared that receive tax refunds was well above the national average of returns to receive refunds.

34. Though Denny drafted the referral letter in 2003, it contains statistics purporting to be for 2004.

35. Denny's referral letter stated that Cruz was a convicted felon. It also claimed, erroneously, that Cruz had a grand theft conviction for making unauthorized charges on his father's credit card.

36. In the fall of 2004, the LDC authorized Denny to commence an investigation of Cruz and NBC.

37. Leavitt was tasked with leading the investigation.

38. Leavitt met with Cruz in September of 2004. NTS was not established as of this meeting. Cf. supra, ¶ 2.

39. At the meeting, Leavitt told Cruz she was conducting an investigation; they discussed Cruz's business practices, his tax knowledge, and other matters relevant to her investigation. Leavitt requested NBC's entire client list. Gov. Ex. 43.

40. Cruz provided all of the information requested. When Cruz asked for details about the investigation, Leavitt would not provide him with any information.

41. Following this first meeting, Leavitt began her investigation. See infra, ¶¶ 49, et seq. below.

42. Leavitt met with Cruz again in the Fall of 2006. Gov. Ex. 66. At this time, based in part on the original returns selected for audit, Leavitt identified several types of repetitive problems on the returns prepared by NBC/NTS. Prior to this second meeting, Leavitt informed Cruz of the Internal Revenue Code sections that she considered to be problem areas on the returns prepared by NBC/NTS.

43. At the second meeting Cruz provided Leavitt with various materials in an attempt to show NBC/NTS's compliance with respect to these Code sections. Gov. Ex. 67.

44. Following the second meeting Cruz again provided additional materials to Leavitt in an attempt to show his compliance with the Code sections identified to be problem areas. Gov. Ex. 68.

45. Leavitt considered all the materials that Cruz presented in her analysis.

46. During the course of the investigation, Leavitt also met with Real in the same manner that she met with Cruz. Gov. Ex. 69. During this meeting, numerous issues were discussed, and Leavitt requested a list of clients that Real serviced through Ruth Real & Associates.

47. Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6107(b), tax return preparers are required to either keep copies of the returns that they prepared in the last three years or to keep a client list with certain required information.

48. Real was unable to provide Leavitt with either copies of the returns or a client list with the required information because the computer containing this information had crashed. See Gov. Ex. 80.




E. The Investigation


49. As referenced in Paragraphs 39 and 40 above, after their initial meeting in September of 2004, Cruz provided Leavitt with NBC's client list.

50. Leavitt randomly selected twenty-five returns.

51. Of these returns, she excluded four because the taxpayers lived outside of Florida and could not be readily audited. Of the remaining twenty-one, Leavitt identified thirteen that had large or questionable deductions or exclusions. She kept these to be audited and returned the balance to NBC.

52. Leavitt then selected seventeen more returns using the IRS's DIF program.

53. DIF is a computer program that identifies returns with large or unusual items probable to be questioned during an audit.

54. The total thirty returns selected for audit were assigned to approximately thirty Revenue Agents and Tax Compliance Officers be audited.

55. As the investigation continued over the course of the next several years, Leavitt selected additional returns for audit.

56. Ultimately, 149 income tax returns prepared by NBC and NTS during 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 were audited.

57. There were over forty IRS employees conducting the audits. Leavitt remained in charge of the investigation.




F. Audit Results


58. During the course of the investigation numerous repetitive problems were identified on the audited returns.

59. These repetitive problems included improper and unsubstantiated deductions taken pursuant to §179, failure to apply limits on the deduction of vehicles pursuant to §280F, double counting of deductions, improper treatment of closing costs for the purchase of property, overstated Schedule C expenses, fabricated casualty losses, and others.

60. Section 179 allows a taxpayer to deduct the expense of certain depreciable business assets in a single taxable year, but §280F places a limit on the amount that may be deducted under §179 for passenger automobiles.

61. The Government presented numerous examples of tax returns where NBC/NTS did not correctly take §179 deductions. E.g., Gov. Ex. 1, p. US10403 (Lopez tax return) (Gov. Ex. 94, ¶ 73); id. p. US10924 (Pineda tax return) (Gov. Ex. 94, ¶ 87); id. p. US10566 (Sandra Cruz tax return); id. p. US10726 (Delgado tax return); Gov. Ex. 94, ¶¶ 67, 99, and 108.

62. Any basis in a vehicle not deducted under §179 is to be depreciated over five years. 26 U.S.C. §168(e)(3)(B)(i).

63. In certain instances NBC/NTS impermissibly depreciated vehicles over three years instead of five. E.g., Gov. Ex. 1, p. US10287 (Hernandez tax return); id. p. US10566 (Sandra Cruz tax return) (Gov. Ex. 94, ¶ 27).

64. NBC/NTS prepared a large number of returns with improper § 179 deductions for truck purchases and truck overhauls.

65. These included numerous §179 deductions that were unsubstantiated. In some cases the returns claimed a large § 179 deduction for the purchase of a truck in one year and also a large §179 deduction for an overhaul of the truck in the following year, or the returns claimed deductions for major overhauls in back to back years. E.g., Gov. Ex. 94, ¶¶ 13, 29, 37, 38, 57, 61(b), 93, and 105.

66. NBC/NTS also claimed deductions twice on the same return in some instances. E.g., Gov. Ex. 1, p. US10827 (Covington/Affordable Borders, Inc. tax return) (Gov. Ex. 94, ¶ 25).

67. NBC/NTS also impermissibly deducted closing costs for the purchase of real property. Gov. Ex. 94, ¶ 9 (Amado tax return); id. ¶ 95 (Robaina tax return).

68. Closing costs should not be deducted as expenses but added to the taxpayer's basis in the property. IRS Pub. 530, p. 9 (2007).

69. On some returns, NBC/NTS also deducted amounts paid for the repayment of loan principle. E.g., Gov. Ex. 94, ¶ 40(b) (William Forde PA tax return). There is no deduction allowed for repayment of principle on a loan.

70. NBC/NTS also prepared corporate returns that claimed deductions for an officer's compensation but then failed to include that officer's compensation as income on the officer's personal returns. E.g., Gov. Ex. 94, ¶ 44.

71. NBC/NTS improperly reported a corporate officer's compensation on at least one individual tax return that listed it in a manner that avoided the requirement for the corporation to pay employment taxes on the income. E.g., Gov. Ex. 94, ¶ 51.

72. NBC/NTS also improperly deducted an automobile expense on at least one corporate return when the automobile was owned by the shareholder and not the corporation. E.g., Gov. Ex. 94, ¶ 83(b).

73. NBC/NTS also prepared at least one return that did not report any salary paid to a corporate officer but did report distribution income. E.g., Gov. Ex. 94, ¶ 101. It is improper for an officer of a closely held corporation to receive only distributions and no salary. Rev. Rul. 74-44 1974-1 C.B. 287.

74. NBC/NTS prepared returns that impermissibly claimed a deduction for a leasehold improvement on returns that also claimed a deduction for mortgage interest. See, e.g., Gov. Ex. 16 (Gopalgi tax return, Schedule C, line 13 and Schedule A, line 10); Gov. Ex. 24 (Negret tax return, Schedule C, line 13 and Schedule A, line 10).

75. To claim a deduction for money expended on an improvement to leased real property, the real property must be a nonresidential leasehold estate. 26 U.S.C. §168(i)(8)(A).

76. The deductions for mortgage interest on the returns noted in ¶ 74 made it clear that the real property for which the leasehold improvement deduction was claimed was not leasehold property, because mortgage interest can only be deducted for residential real property. 26 U.S.C. §163(h).

77. The actions recounted in Paragraphs 61, 63, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 resulted in an understatement of the taxpayers' tax liabilities and a loss to the United States Treasury.




G. Non-audit Investigation Facts


78. On July 18, 2007, the Government issued a press release that recited the positions taken its Complaint filed herein. Def. Ex. 12. The release did not make light of the Government's understanding of Defendants' practices.

79. In or about January 2008, Leavitt sent letters to 80 of the clients of NBC/NTS who were being audited in this investigation stating that the Department of Justice was seeking to enjoin Defendants from preparing tax returns and providing any sort of tax representation or advice. See, e.g., Def. Ex. 35.

80. In general, the letters stated the nature of items on the sample of returns that were disallowed by the IRS and asked the taxpayers if they told Cruz or the staff at NTS the information for the item that the IRS had disallowed on the taxpayer's return in particular.

81. Eight taxpayers replied to the letter.

82. Leavitt called the other taxpayers on the telephone, and another 7 agreed to talk to her.




H. National Statistics Published by the IRS


83. IRS-published statistics reflect that for tax year 2004, the average recommended additional tax resulting from audits of tax returns with Schedule C total gross receipts between $25,000 and $100,000 was $6,629 when the audit was conducted by a Revenue Agent. Def. Ex. 27.

84. IRS-published statistics reflect that for tax year 2004, the average recommended additional tax resulting from audits of tax returns with Schedule C total gross receipts between $25,000 and $100,000 was $12,323 when the audit was conducted by a Tax Examiner. Id.

85. IRS-published statistics reflect that for tax year 2004, the average recommended additional tax resulting from audits of tax returns with Schedule C total gross receipts between $25,000 and $100,000 was $1,994 when conducted through the mail, known as a correspondence audit. Id.

86. IRS-published statistics reflect that for tax year 2004, the average recommended additional tax resulting from audits of tax returns with Schedule C total gross receipts over $100,000 was $20,956 when conducted by a Revenue Agent. Def. Ex. 27.

87. IRS-published statistics reflect that for tax year 2004, the average recommended additional tax resulting from audits of tax returns with Schedule C total gross receipts over $100,000 was $55,330 when conducted by a Tax Examiner. Id.

88. IRS-published statistics reflect that for tax year 2004, the average recommended additional tax resulting from audits of tax returns with Schedule C total gross receipts over $100,000 was $2,892 when conducted as a correspondence audit. Id.

89. IRS-published statistics reflect that for tax year 2005, the average recommended additional tax resulting from audits of tax returns with Schedule C total gross receipts between $25,000 and $100,000 was $9,713 when conducted by a Revenue Agent. Def. Ex. 28.

90. IRS-published statistics reflect that for tax year 2005, the average recommended additional tax resulting from audits of tax returns with Schedule C total gross receipts between $25,000 and $100,000 was $5,801 when conducted by a Tax Compliance Officer. Id.

91. IRS-published statistics reflect that for tax year 2005, the average recommended additional tax resulting from audits of tax returns with Schedule C total gross receipts between $25,000 and $100,000 was $7,443 when conducted as a correspondence audit. Id.

92. IRS-published statistics reflect that for tax year 2005, the average recommended additional tax resulting from audits of tax returns with Schedule C total gross receipts over $100,000 was $37,024 when conducted by a Revenue Agent. Id.

93. IRS-published statistics reflect that for tax year 2005, the average recommended additional tax resulting from audits of tax returns with Schedule C total gross receipts over $100,000 was $4,641 when conducted by a Tax Examiner. Id.

94. IRS-published statistics reflect that for tax year 2005, the average recommended additional tax resulting from audits of tax returns with Schedule C total gross receipts over $100,000 was $21,032 when conducted as a correspondence audit. Id.

95. IRS-published statistics reflect that for tax year 2004, the average recommended additional tax resulting from audits of all non-business returns, except 1040A, with total positive income 1 between $50,000 and $100,000 was $7,975 when conducted by a Revenue Agent. Def. Ex. 27.

96. IRS-published statistics reflect that for tax year 2004, the average recommended additional tax resulting from audits of all non-business returns, except 1040A, with total positive income between $50,000 and $100,000 was $5,823 when conducted by a Tax Examiner. Id.

97. IRS-published statistics reflect that for tax year 2004, the average recommended additional tax resulting from audits of all non-business returns, except 1040A, with total positive income between $50,000 and $100,000 was $2,299 when the audit was conducted as a correspondence audit. Id.

98. IRS-published statistics reflect that for tax year 2005, the average recommended additional tax resulting from audits of all non-business returns, except 1040A, with total positive income between $50,000 and $100,000 was $11,098 when conducted by a Revenue Agent. Def. Ex. 28.

99. IRS-published statistics reflect that for tax year 2005, the average recommended additional tax resulting from audits of all non-business returns, except 1040A, with total positive income between $50,000 and $100,000 was $7,286 when conducted by a Tax Examiner. Id.

100. IRS-published statistics reflect that for tax year 2005, the average recommended additional tax resulting from audits of all non-business returns, except 1040A, with total positive income between $50,000 and $100,000 was $1,902 when conducted as a correspondence audit. Id.




I. 2003 audit results


101. The Government's investigation consisted of audits of a sample of 149 returns prepared by Defendants. See ¶¶ 49-56.

102. The sample of 149 returns in the Government's investigation included 46 prepared by NBC/NTS for tax year 2003. Def. Ex. 23.

103. These returns represent 1% of the approximate 4,600 returns that Defendants prepared for that year.

104. Only returns with large or unusual items and/or high DIF scores were selected for audit.

105. The average loss established by the 46 returns audited for tax year 2003 is $7,658.83. Def. Ex. 23.

106. This number is reasonably close to the average recommended additional tax figures published by the IRS for subsequent years. See Def. Exs. 27 & 28.

107. Of the 46 returns audited for tax year 2003, 10 are reflected as cases were the taxpayer failed to appear and the additional tax was assessed. Def. Ex. 23.

108. Two of the remaining 36 audits resulted in no change. Id.

109. Five of the remaining 34 returns audited for the tax year 2003 remained pending in Appeals as of the time of trial in this matter. Id.

110. A majority of the returns had additional taxes asserted because the taxpayer failed to produce documentation necessary to substantiate deductions taken on the returns.




J. 2004 audit results


111. The Government audited 86 returns for tax year 2004. Def. Ex. 24.

112. These returns represented 1.7% of the approximate 4,960 returns that Defendants prepared for that year.

113. Only returns with large or unusual items and/or high DIF scores were selected.

114. The average loss established by the 86 returns audited for tax year 2004 is $7,858.94. Def. Ex. 24.

115. This does not depart very far from the average recommended tax loss estimated by IRS-published statistics. Def. Ex. 27.

116. Of the 86 returns audited for tax year 2004, 7 taxpayers failed to appear. Def. Ex. 24.

117. Of the remaining 79 returns audited, 2 were determined to have no change. Id.

118. Of the 86 returns audited for tax year 2004, 19 taxpayers remained pending in Appeals as of the time of trial in this matter. Id.

119. A majority of the returns had additional taxes asserted because the taxpayer failed to produce documentation necessary to substantiate deductions taken on the return.




K. 2005 audit results


120. The Government audited 61 returns for tax year 2005. Def. Ex. 25.

121. These returns represented about 1.3% of the over 4,500 returns Defendants prepared for that year.

122. Only returns with large or unusual items and/or high DIF scores were selected.

123. The average loss established by the 61 returns audited for tax year 2005 was $9,711.18. See Def. Ex. 25.

124. This is within the average additional tax recommended by IRS-published statistics. See Def. Ex. 28.

125. Of the 61 returns audited for 2005, 5 taxpayers failed to appear. Def. Ex. 25.

126. Of the 56 remaining returns, 19 remained pending in Appeals as of the time of trial in this matter. Id.

127. Of the 37 remaining returns a majority had additional taxes asserted due to the failure of the taxpayers to produce documentation necessary to substantiate deductions taken on the return.




L. 2006 audit results


128. The Government audited 31 returns for tax year 2006.

129. These returns represented less than 1% of the approximate 5000 returns Defendants prepared for that year.

130. Of the 31 returns audited for 2006, 7 resulted in no change. Def. Ex. 26.

131. Of the remaining 24 returns audited for 2006, 5 remained pending in Appeals as of the time of trial in this matter. Id.

132. A majority of the remaining 19 returns had additional taxes asserted due to the failure of the taxpayers to produce documentation necessary to substantiate deductions taken on the return.

133. The average tax loss established by the 31 returns audited for tax year 2006 was $5,620.65.

134. Neither Party submitted figures for IRS-published statistics for 2006. However, assuming figures from the two previous years provide an adequate benchmark, the figure noted in Paragraph 136 is reasonably close to or below the average recommended additional tax figures published by the IRS for preceding years. See Def. Exs. 27 & 28.




M. Conclusions To Be Drawn From the Investigation


135. The kind and quantity of errors found on the sample of 146 audited tax returns is reflected in the following table:




Number of Number of Number of Number of
returns in returns in returns in returns in
2003 sample 2004 sample 2005 sample 2006 sample
(& percent (& percent (& percent (& percent
of total) of total) of total) of total)

Total returns 46 86 61 31

Schedule C
depreciation 23 (50%) 23 (27%) 4 (6.6%) 0 (0%)

Schedule C
expenses 24 (52%) 37 (43%) 17 (29%) 5 (16%)

Earned income
credit 10 (22%) 18 (21%) 11 (18%) 1 (3.2%)

Child tax credit 11 (24%) 14 (16%) 6 (9.8%) 1 (3.2%)

Add'l child tax
credit 7 (15%) 20 (23%) 10 (16%) 1 (3.2%)

Education credit 7 (15%) 7 (8.1%) N/A 0 (0%)

Casualty/theft
loss N/A N/A 17 (28%) 4 (13%)

Foreignearned N/A 10 (12%) 6 (9.8%) 0 (0%)
income exclusion
( §911)

Employee 8 (17%) 16 (17%) 7 (11%) 0 (0%)
business
expenses

Schedule E 13 (28%) 15 (17%) 4 (6.6%) N/A
expenses or
flow-through

Form 4797 loss 3 (6.5%) 5 (5.8%) 2 (3.2%) 0 (0%)




See Def. Exs. 23-26. 2

136. The losses shown by mistakes and errors on the sample of 149 returns establish that Defendants' actions caused losses to the United States Treasury.

137. Defendants' Exhibits 23-26, as summarized in the chart above, demonstrate that the instances of errors uncovered in the Government's investigation of the sample of 146 returns diminished as the investigation continued.

138. The timing of the decline in these problems coincided with Defendants' knowledge of the Government's investigation and ability to address and correct problems. See ¶¶ 38-42.

139. During the years at issue, NBC/NTS prepared approximately 4,800 returns each year.

140. NBC/NTS prepared over 4,600 tax returns for 2003. A total of 360 returns reported casualty loss claims (7.8% of total), 63 returns claimed the foreign earned income exclusion (1.4% of total), and only 148 returns were tax returns of truckers with Schedule C expenses and/or depreciation expenses (3.2% of total).

141. NBC/NTS prepared 4,960 tax returns for 2004. A total of 528 returns reported casualty loss claims (10.6% of total), 78 returns claimed the foreign earned income exclusion (1.6% of total), and only 144 returns were returns of truckers with Schedule C expenses and/or depreciation expenses (2.9% of total).

142. Following the 7 preparer penalties imposed for returns prepared in 1993 and 1994, Defendants have not filed any return claiming the fuel tax credit for a trucker.

143. During the entire period of this investigation, and indeed since 1998, no preparer penalty was ever assessed against Cruz.

144. As stated previously, no preparer penalty has ever been assessed against Real.




N. Comparison With National Facts


145. Testimony by IRS employees at trial established that a high percentage of tax returns audited nationwide result in additional taxes proposed.

146. Approximately 90% of audits conducted by Revenue Agents, Tax Examiners, and Tax Compliance Officers result in additional taxes being proposed.

147. The major areas resulting in additional taxes after audit include:


A) Depreciation;



B) Schedule C expenses;



C) Employee business expenses, including automobiles;



D) Casualty losses; and



E) Foreign-earned income exclusions.


148. The areas that result in additional taxes throughout the United States are the same areas that the Government has identified as areas of concern on Defendants' returns.

149. The rate of audits resulting in no change to the returns prepared by Defendants is consistent with the rate of audits resulting in no change to returns filed nationally.




O. Audit Representation


150. NBC and NTS provided audit representation services to their clients.

151. They have stopped accepting new engagements for representation before the IRS, but they continue to represent any previously engaged taxpayers.

152. During an audit, a taxpayer may choose to be represented by a Power of Attorney (hereinafter "POA"), sometimes called a "representative."

153. A taxpayer may appoint a POA by submitting IRS Form 2848 to the IRS. Once appointed, the POA can act on behalf of the taxpayer during the audit. The POA can speak directly with the IRS employee who is conducting the audit, and these conversations often occur outside the presence of the taxpayer. The auditor can discuss substantive matters with the POA, and the POA can address any issues or concerns that the auditor might raise throughout the course of the audit.

154. In contrast to appointing a POA, a taxpayer may also merely authorize the release of tax return information to a third party by submitting IRS Form 8821. Form 8821 authorizes the release of taxpayer information to the specific third party named therein. This Form does not appoint the named third party as a POA or authorize that person to act as such.

155. The IRS places restrictions on the people who may be appointed as a POA. This is with good reason, partly to ensure that the taxpayer receives competent representation during the course of the audit.

156. CPAs and attorneys are permitted to act as POAs before the IRS. Additionally, enrolled agents can also represent taxpayers in audits before the IRS.

157. In order to be an enrolled agent, one must demonstrate competence in tax matters by passing an IRS-administered exam and a background examination. An enrolled agent may be appointed as a POA in an audit regardless of whether that person actually prepared the tax return that is being audited.

158. An "unenrolled" preparer is one who is not specifically enrolled by the Internal Revenue Service. An unenrolled preparer may only be appointed as a POA in an audit where the unenrolled preparer prepared and signed the return that is being audited. Even where an unenrolled preparer has signed the return that is being audited, that person may not represent the taxpayer in the IRS appeals process.

159. As previously discussed, in 1998 the IRS barred Cruz from representing any taxpayers in audits before it. See supra ¶ 17; Gov. Ex. 46.

160. As Cruz is no longer permitted to represent clients before the IRS in audits, NBC and NTS provide these services through Defendant Real. No other employee of NBC or NTS is an enrolled agent.

161. Real is an unenrolled preparer because she has not passed the examination or background check to be enrolled.

162. Nevertheless, Real has submitted Form 2848 in cases where she is not qualified to be the POA because she did not prepare the return that is being audited. In other cases Real simply submitted a Form 8821.

163. In some cases when Real submitted a Form 8821, she would still accompany the taxpayer to meetings with the auditor. Although not permitted to do so, she would participate in substantive discussions with the auditor.

164. In other instances where only a Form 8821 was filed Real would attend meetings with the auditor outside the presence of the taxpayer.

165. While it is clear Real either did not understand the difference between Forms 2848 and 8821, or purposely misused them, the evidence established that IRS employees also failed to grasp the difference and proper procedure. See Def. Ex. 31 (email from Leavitt stating: "I have constantly seen both [Tax Compliance Officers] and [Revenue Agents] allowing Ruth Real to function as POA when she has only submitted Form 8821. I have tried to talk to various people individually to drive home the important distinction between Forms 2848 and 8821, but sometimes I feel like I'm hitting a brick wall.").

166. This failure on the part of the IRS to appreciate the difference between Forms 2848 and 8821 is also evidenced by the fact that it allowed Real, without penalty, to engage continuously in the very acts of improper representation of which it now complains.

167. Real was the legitimate third party designated by Form 8821 and was the legitimate unenrolled representative for a great many of Defendants' clients being audited by the IRS.

168. Real found it increasingly difficult to comply with all of the scheduling and document request demands placed on her by the volume of audits conducted by the Government.

169. In numerous instances, IRS employees failed to work reasonably with Real in the conduct of their audits. In one case Real was excluded from an audit meeting with an IRS employee even though she was permitted by IRS procedure to be present at the audit because the taxpayer filed Form 2848 and Real prepared the return.




P. Engagement Letter


170. NBC and NTS use an engagement letter with their clients. E.g., Gov. Ex. 87.

171. The testimony at trial established that identical letters were sent to each client for the purposes of obtaining their consent to Defendants' representation during audit and to receive information about the taxpayer from the IRS.

172. This letter expressly states that for a fee NTS will represent the taxpayer at audits with the IRS and "at the appellate level, if an appeal is necessary." Id.

173. The letter states that Form 8821 is attached, but misnames it "Authorization and Declaration of Representative."

174. Form 8821 is actually titled "Tax Information Authorization."

175. The letter is sent over Cruz's name, with a copy to "Ruth Real/Representative."

176. The letter is misleading to clients. First, no person at NBC or NTS is eligible to represent clients at audits where he or she did not prepare the return. Thus, in many instances Real cannot provide the services promised in the letter because she did not prepare the client's tax return. Second, Form 8821 discussed in the letter does not appoint a representative to an audit. In fact, Form 8821 never uses the term "representative."

177. If the taxpayer does not agree with the recommended change after the audit, he is free to take his case to a designated appeals officer at the IRS.

178. Unenrolled preparers, such as Real, are never permitted to represent a taxpayer in the appeals process, even if they themselves prepared the return that is at issue.

179. By virtue of his ineligibility, Cruz cannot represent taxpayers in appeals.

180. Thus, neither Cruz nor Real could provide the appellate service promised in the letter.

181. As for the actual representation letter admitted by the Government into evidence as its Exhibit 87, the audit conducted for the named taxpayers therein resulted in no change to the return. See Def. Ex. 25, p. 3.




Q. Remedial Measures


182. After the September of 2004 meeting with Leavitt, Cruz created NTS and immediately began to modify his manner of tax preparation.

183. NTS eventually implemented a new procedure that required the person inputting the taxpayer's data into the computer software to sign the return as the tax preparer. Thus, Cruz stopped signing returns he did not prepare.

184. NTS implemented a new procedure that required all return preparers to successfully complete the annual IRS course given on the internet prior to each tax season.

185. NTS began sending Cruz to an annual IRS-sponsored seminar for income tax preparation.

186. NTS implemented a new procedure requiring the taxpayer to initial an instruction letter and a summary of the deductions taken on the return. Def. Ex. 36.

187. NTS also required that each page of the tax return to be signed by the taxpayer.

188. These added procedures are not required by the Internal Revenue Code.

189. These added procedures are not common among tax return preparers.

190. Cruz initiated these policies to reduce erroneous items on returns prepared at NTS.

191. Clients of NBC and NTS are still not required to submit an organized and documented statement of all expenses qualifying for deduction or exclusion on the tax returns prior to their appointments, and no procedure is maintained for documenting what specific information the client provides.

192. It was and remains the responsibility of the taxpayer to maintain cancelled checks, receipts, and other documentation evidencing items listed on his tax return for purposes of supporting positions taken if challenged by the IRS.




III. Conclusions of Law


The United States brought this civil action under 26 U.S.C. §§7402(a), 7407 and 7408 to permanently enjoin Defendants from preparing or assisting in the preparation of tax returns and from engaging in conduct that interferes with the proper administration and enforcement of the internal revenue laws. Those statutes each provide an independent authorization for an injunction.

Under §7407, the Court may enjoin Defendants from engaging in certain prohibited conduct or from further acting as tax return preparers. Relevant to the instant action, the injunction may issue if the Court finds Defendants engaged in any of the following conduct: 1) any conduct subject to penalty under §§6694 or 6695; 2) misrepresenting their eligibility to practice before the IRS; or 3) engaging in any other fraudulent or deceptive conduct that substantially interferes with the proper administration of the internal revenue laws. 26 U.S.C. §7407(b)(1). The Government alleges that Defendants engaged in all of this conduct.

Section 6694 prohibits two different types of conduct. 3 First, it prohibits a tax return preparer from taking an unreasonable position on a tax return. A position is unreasonable if the preparer knew or should have known about it, there was not a reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on the merits, and there was no reasonable basis for the position. Second, §6694 also prohibits a return preparer from making a willful attempt to understate a taxpayer's tax liability on the return or engaging in a reckless or intentional disregard of rules or regulations.

Section 6695(d), in relevant part, imposes a duty upon a tax return preparer to comply with §6107(b). Section 6107(b), in turn, requires a tax return preparer to retain a copy of each return prepared or maintain a list of the name and identification number of each taxpayer for inspection by the IRS.

As stated above, a person not a CPA or licensed attorney may represent clients at audits only if he prepared the tax return. He may not represent the taxpayer in any case on appeal, even if he prepared the return. Finally, a range of conduct may be considered fraudulent or deceptive and impeding of the proper enforcement of the internal revenue laws.

In order to grant relief enjoining the offending conduct, §7407 requires the Court to find that injunctive relief is appropriate to prevent the reoccurrence of the same. In order to issue an injunction under §7407 that totally bars Defendants from acting as tax return preparers, the Court must further find that Defendants continually or repeatedly engaged in such conduct and that an injunction limited to prohibiting such conduct would not be sufficient to prevent their interference with the proper administration fo the internal revenue laws. 26 U.S.C. §7407(b).

Under §7408, the Court may issue an injunction upon a finding that Defendants engaged in any "specified conduct" and that injunctive relief is appropriate to prevent reoccurrence of the same. The term "specified conduct" means, in relevant part, any action or failure to act that is subject to penalty under §6701. Section 6701 prohibits any person from aiding, assisting, or advising in the preparation of any portion of a return if he knows or has reason to believe that such portion will be used in connection with any material matter arising under the internal revenue laws and knows that such portion would result in an understatement of the taxpayer's tax liability. Upon a finding that a person has violated §6701 and that injunctive relief is appropriate, the Court may enjoin such conduct or enjoin any other activity subject to penalty by Title 26. 26 U.S.C. §7408(b).

Finally, under §7402(a), the Court has the power to issue any injunctions, writs, processes, judgments, or decrees as may be necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws.

The Government seeks only injunctive relief and thus invokes the Court's equitable power. The decision "whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests with the equitable discretion of the district courts, and ... such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity." eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006). Consistent with traditional equitable principles, a permanent injunction is warranted when (1) there has been irreparable injury, (2) damages at law are inadequate, (3) a balance of the hardships weighs in favor of the injunction, and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by the permanent injunction. Angel Flight of Ga., Inc. v. Angel Flight of Am., Inc., 522 F.3d 1200, 1208 (11th Cir. Apr. 4, 2008) (citing eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. at 391). The scope of the injunction is likewise in the discretion of the Court. Id. (noting that both the decision to grant and the scope are reviewed for abuse of discretion).

Considering all these factors, the Court finds that an injunction is warranted. The evidence readily establishes that Defendants have been derelict in their duties as tax return preparers. The Court will touch upon each in turn.

Defendants' conduct calls for an injunction under §7407(b)(1)(A). This arises from their conduct subject to penalty under §6694(a) of preparing income tax returns based on fraudulent deductions and credits, which resulted in understatements of liability. The specifics of these improper positions taken on the returns are recounted in the Court's Findings of Fact, supra. Further, Defendants knew or reasonably should have known of the positions being taken in the returns that they prepared. 26 U.S.C. §6694(a). For example, Defendants should clearly know that it is impermissible to claim a deduction for a corporate officer's compensation on a corporate tax return but fail to include that income on the shareholder's personal tax return. Defendants should also know that vehicles should be properly depreciated as five year property instead of three year property. With respect to the §179 deductions, Defendants also prepared returns on behalf of trucking clients that claimed deductions for major overhauls to trucks in two subsequent years. Given that Defendants prepared the returns in both years, they knew or should have known that they were claiming an improper deduction on the second year's return. These and other positions taken are all in direct contravention of the Internal Revenue Code and applicable regulations, and they have no possibility of being sustained upon audit. Therefore, during the time period in question, Defendants prepared tax returns in violation of §6694, which subjects them to liability for injunctive relief under §7407(b)(1)(A).

Defendants are also subject to injunction under §7407(b)(1)(B) because they each have misrepresented their eligibility to practice before the IRS. Defendant Cruz has been barred from practice before the IRS since 1998. As a result, he is barred from participating in "all matters connected with a presentation to the Internal Revenue Service or any of its officers or employees relating to a taxpayer's rights, privileges, or liabilities under laws or regulations administered by the Internal Revenue Service." 31 C.F.R. §10.2(a)(5). This includes corresponding with the IRS and representing a client at conferences, hearings, and meetings. Id.

Although not barred from practice before the IRS, Defendant Real is not a "practitioner" with full rights to practice before the IRS. Id. §10.2(a)(5). Rather, Defendant Real is authorized only to conduct "limited practice" before the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to 31 C.F.R., Part 10.7(c)(1)(viii). Under that regulation, Real is authorized to represent taxpayers on whose behalf she prepared and signed a tax return, but only during an examination with respect to that tax return and only before revenue agents, customer service representatives or similar officers and employees of the I RS. 31 C.F.R. §10.7(c)(1)(viii). The authorization specifically "does not permit [Real] to represent the taxpayer, regardless of the circumstances requiring representation, before appeals officers, revenue officers, Counsel or similar officers or employees of the Internal Revenue Service or the Department of Treasury." Id.

Thus, Defendant Cruz is not authorized to conduct any representation of taxpayers before the Internal Revenue Service, and Defendant Real is authorized only to represent taxpayers on whose behalf she prepared a return, but not in any appeals or other proceedings. Despite these clear and precise restrictions, on numerous occasions, Defendants have both misrepresented to taxpayer clients their authority to represent those taxpayer clients before the Internal Revenue Service. See supra, ¶¶ 150-180. Thus, Defendants Cruz and Real each misrepresented their eligibility to practice before the IRS, which subjects them to liability for injunctive relief under 26 U.S.C. §7407(b)(1)(B).

The same conduct subjects Defendants to an injunction under §7408 because they have engaged in conduct subject to penalty under §6701. All of the tax returns in question were prepared with the aid, assistance, or advice of Defendants. Also, Defendants plainly knew or had reason to believe that the returns would be used in connection with material matters arising under the internal revenue laws, inasmuch as they were preparing the returns for filing with the IRS. Finally, Defendants also knew that those returns containing errors would result in an understatement of tax liability. 26 U.S.C. §6701(a). Thus, Defendants have engaged in conduct subject to penalty under § 6701, which renders them subject to injunction under 26 U.S.C. §7408.

Based on all of the foregoing, the Court is compelled also to exercise its power under §7402 to issue such ruling as is necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws. 26 U.S.C. §7402(a). A stable treasury being necessary to the security of this Nation, Defendants' previous conduct requires redressing.

Notwithstanding the need for injunctive relief, the Court is unwilling to go as far as the Government seeks. The Government argues that the average tax loss calculated from the sample of 149 tax returns audited can be extrapolated to the entire population of tax returns prepared by Defendants each year. However, such extrapolation is not a fair inference to be drawn from the evidence introduced at trial. A majority of the returns prepared by Defendants do not contain any of the items for which errors were found in the 149 returns audited. For example, it would not be appropriate to extrapolate the average loss found on the 46 returns audited for 2003 to all 4,600 returns prepared by NBC/NTS for that year when the losses were generated by a deduction or credit that over 90% of the returns did not have. See supra ¶ 140. For the same reason, it would not be appropriate to extrapolate a loss to all 4,960 returns prepared by NBC/NTS for 2004 when the proposed loss was generated by a deduction or credit that over 88% of those returns did not have. See supra, ¶ 141.

In addition, the Government seeks to hold Defendants liable for certain items on tax returns ultimately denied at audit simply because the taxpayer could not provide adequate documentation to substantiate the position. This is improper. The conduct alleged as supporting the injunction sought by the Government requires that Defendants act unreasonably; that is, they must have no reasonable belief that the position on the tax return would be more likely than not sustained on the merits, and there was no reasonable basis for the position. 26 U.S.C. §6694. There is no per se liability for a tax return preparer whose client is found to have errors on the return when the figures appear reasonable on their face. It was and remains the responsibility of taxpayer to support deductions with documentation if questioned by the IRS.

No pattern of fraudulent or deceptive conduct was established such that all returns prepared by Defendants, or even a great majority of them, can be said to suffer from the same errors as found in the sample of 149 returns. The facts demonstrate that Defendants caused losses to the United States Treasury. It can be fairly inferred that some of Defendants' returns not audited have the same errors on them as those in the sample of 149 returns. Thus, it can be fairly inferred that the loss to the Untied States Treasury is greater than the sample of 149 returns demonstrates. However, the Government's allegation that the United States Treasury lost an estimated $55 million due to Defendants' actions for tax years 2003 and 2004 alone, see Complaint, DE 1, ¶ 21, is wholly unsupported by the evidence or permissible inferences drawn therefrom. The evidence in the record establishes that Defendants have peppered their returns with numerous mistakes resulting in losses to the United States Treasury. It does not support the allegation that Defendants are engaged in an ongoing pattern of fraudulent conduct.

Further, the evidence does not support the allegation that Defendants have been undeterred by the preparer penalties asserted in the past or by this investigation. Rather, the evidence clearly establishes that previously penalized positions taken by Cruz did not resurface in the investigation made for the instant action. Moreover, after learning what areas had recurring problems, Defendants worked to seriously reduce the number of errors made on tax returns, as reflected in the rate of errors for the 149 sample returns. See supra, ¶ 135.

Thus, an injunction is warranted under all three statutes invoked by the Government. 26 U.S.C. §§7407, 7408, & 7402. What remains is consideration of the scope of the injunction. The Court turns to the factors recited in Angel Flight, 522 F.3d at 1208.

First, the United States has suffered irreparable harm, and it is likely that it will continue to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction. Defendants have engaged in numerous instances of conduct that violate provisions of the tax code over a period of many years resulting in losses to the United States Treasury. The Government cannot be expected to audit every tax return filed. Thus, there is no way to recover a portion of the losses caused by errors on Defendants' returns. Second, the Government has no adequate remedy at law. No Party has demonstrated what legal relief is available to the Government. To prevent future reoccurrence of the problems highlighted above, injunctive relief is warranted.

Third, a balance of the hardships weighs clearly in favor of an injunction. The Government proved that Defendants intentionally caused losses to the United States Treasury by their misstatements on tax returns. While human error is always to be expected, the internal revenue laws operate as strict rules that tax return preparers are expected to abide by. Finally, the public interest will clearly be served by an injunction. To the extent that an injunction aids in the reduction in the filing of erroneous returns that cause loss to the United States Treasury --and therefore, to all taxpayers --the public is served by granting injunctive relief. Thus, to improve the status quo, an injunction is clearly warranted. However, the question remains as to the scope of the injunction to be granted.

Defendants have clearly made a good faith effort toward eliminating the kinds of errors, and hopefully all errors, recounted in this Order. The rate of errors uncovered by the Government's audit of the 149 returns diminished year by year, many of them precipitously. See supra, ¶ 135. Defendants have adopted new practices aimed to ensure the taxpayer is informed of the contents of the return and to prevent unintended errors. See supra, ¶¶ 182-187. In addition, a number of the errors found on the tax returns audited can be explained as simple human error. While this does not immunize the need to recoup this loss in revenue, it lessens the culpability of Defendants. Even the IRS makes mistakes sometimes. See, e.g., Def. Ex. 24, p. 1, and Def. Ex. 25, p. 1 (both prepared by the Government and both listing an item in the wrong column). Human error abounds.

Relevant to the fourth factor noted above, the public is served by having tax return preparation businesses in business. It is a rare breed that can competently navigate the intricacies of the Internal Revenue Code. Thus, the public is benefitted by having tax preparation services both available and affordable. When injunctive relief is available that can balance both the public need for tax preparation services and the need for accurate tax filings, it will be preferred over a total ban on tax preparation.

In addition, the Government's own conduct weighs against it as to the scope of the injunction to be imposed. The IRS has refrained for years before instituting any action against Defendants or imposing penalties for the errors and unreasonable positions of which they were undoubtedly aware. If the IRS was so wronged by Defendants' actions, why did it wait for the damages to be aggravated over a number of years? While the Government is not required to seek penalties and relief on a graduated basis --in other words, the statutes noted above plainly allow a firstinstance permanent injunction from tax return preparation --the Court must remember that it is exercising its equitable power. The Court will not levy the business death penalty on these facts. Because of the delay in enforcement by the IRS, coupled with Defendants' impressive effort to redress the wrongs uncovered, the balance of the hardships weighs against a permanent bar from the preparation of tax returns.

A first-instance injunction against prohibited conduct will be effective to prevent this conduct by these Defendants in the future. See United States v. Gleason, 432 F.3d 678, 681 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming the district court's denial of a permanent bar from preparing taxes based on the fact that tax preparation was the defendant's primary business and livelihood and should thus not be taken lightly). Should Defendants engage in the conduct enjoined by the Court, not only will they be in violation of the law, they will be in violation of this Court's Order. Different facts will surely make for a different outcome.

Accordingly, after due consideration, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Court has jurisdiction of the Parties hereto and the subject matter herein;

2. The Court finds in favor of the Government and against Defendants; and

3. Final Judgment will be entered by separate order.

DONE AND ORDERED.

1 "Total positive income" is defined by the IRS as "the sum of all positive amounts shown for the various sources of income reported on the individual income tax return and, thus, excludes net losses." Def. Ex. 27, p. 2, ¶ 10.

2 Items marked "N/A" do not appear on the Exhibit noted.

3 All references to §6694 herein are to the version predating that which took effect October 3, 2008.

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